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INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT VERSION 3.0: MISSOURI
RIVER BASIN COMPACT DRAFTERS SHOULD CONSIDER AN
INTER-SOVEREIGN APPROACH TO ACCOMMODATE
FEDERAL AND TRIBAL INTERESTS IN WATER RESOURCES
JEFFREY T. MATSON

ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the historic 2011 Missouri River flood, Missouri
River Basin (MRB) state representatives and governors criticize the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for operating the Missouri River
Mainstem Reservoir System (System) in support of the multiple, often
conflicting, purposes outlined in the Flood Control Act of 1944. These
officials envision entering into an interstate compact to divest the Corps of
some of its operational authority and to broaden their role in managing
water resources. Similarly, MRB tribal leaders argue that the Corps fails to
operate its System in a manner that respects the interrelated issues of Indian
reserved water rights and tribal sovereignty. As States and Tribes
contemplate a rebalancing of power in the MRB, it is essential that any
water resources management solution provide a forum in which affected
States, Tribes, and the Federal government might work together in pursuit
of interconnected interests. Accordingly, it is time for stakeholders to think
beyond the dualistic “federal-interstate” compact arrangement and seriously
consider a pluralistic “federal-interstate-tribal” approach – even if Indian
reserved water rights are not yet quantified. Although such a tripartite
approach is a departure from traditional compacting practice, the great
weight of Indian reserved water rights warrants tribal representation on any
commission charged with implementing a twenty-first century MRB water
resources compact. Further, it would be unrealistic to expect a federal
commissioner to represent tribal interests until such time as rights are
quantified, given the Federal government’s conflict of interest in operating
the System for other consumptive users. This Article concludes that the
 Attorney, Ater Wynne LLP; J.D. and Certificate in Environmental & Natural Resources
Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, 2012; B.S., Environmental Engineering, United States Military
Academy at West Point. The author would like to thank Lt. Col. (Ret.) Christina Austin-Smith for
introducing him to the myriad challenges associated with managing the “Big Muddy.” The author
also extends his gratitude to Jennifer for her unfailing support during the production of this
Article. Finally, the views and opinions in this Article are those of the author and should not be
construed as those of the Department of the Army.
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Federal government’s interests in flood protection, navigation, and national
security, and the Tribes’ interests in protecting reserved water rights and
tribal sovereignty, warrant an inter-sovereign approach whereby power is
shared equally among signatories to this compact.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“In order to survive, a plurality of true communities would require not
egalitarianism and tolerance but knowledge, and understanding of the
necessity of local differences . . . .”1
After the historic 2011 Missouri River flood,2 once and current state
officials in the Missouri River Basin (MRB) argue the United States Army

1. WENDELL BERRY, Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community, in SEX, ECONOMY,
FREEDOM, AND COMMUNITY 117, 173 (1993).
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Corps of Engineers (Corps) failed to operate its Missouri River Mainstem
Reservoir System (System) to maximize flood control3 in accordance with
the Flood Control Act of 1944.4 In a recent hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, MRB farmers,
elected leaders, and interested persons criticized the Corps for operating the
System to benefit enumerated multiple purposes beyond flood control.5
These officials are revisiting the idea of forming an interstate compact
among MRB States to expand6 their role in managing the river.7
2. Ms. Jody Farhat, Chief of Missouri River Basin Water Management in the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Omaha District, described the flood event as a “perfect storm,”
where Rocky Mountain snowmelt – which was 140% of average – and historic rainfalls forced the
Corps to release water from its reservoir system twice as fast as had ever been attempted. Paul
Quinlan, ‘Perfect Storm’ Along Missouri River Puts Army Corps Policies in Cross Hairs, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2011), http://www nytimes.com/gwire/2011/06/17/17greenwire-perfect-stormalong-missouri-river-puts-army-c-55680 html.
3. Missouri Representative Sam Graves expressed, “I believe that we are asking the Corps of
Engineers to juggle too many priorities . . . . We must make clear once and for all that the
prevention of flooding has to be the number one priority.” Graves: Flood Control Should be Top
Priority, CONGRESSMAN SAM GRAVES (Nov. 30, 2011), http://graves house.gov/index.cfm
?sectionid=25&itemid=197. Governors from seven basin states and senior staff of the Wyoming
Governor; called for an independent review of how the Corps operated the System during the
2011 flood. John P. Tretbar, Missouri River Governors Call for Congressional Flood Probe, ST.
JOSEPH POST (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.stjosephpost.com/2011/10/17/missouri-river-governorscall-for-congressional-flood-probe/. Regarding the perceived failure of the Corps to take into
account rising snowpack levels in managing water stored in the large reservoirs in 2011, Missouri
Senator Brad Lager described the Corps’ actions as “border[ing] on the criminal.” Dave Helling
& Scott Canon, As Missouri Floods, Anger Spills Over at Army Corps, MORNING CALL (July 4,
2011),
http://www.mcall.com/news/aan-1a.07-04-11.missflood-20110704,0,5730126.story?
page=2.
4. Act of Dec. 22, 1944 (Flood Control Act of 1944), ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 460d (2006) and scattered sections of Titles 33 and 43 U.S.C). Section 9 of the Flood
Control Act of 1944 authorizes the Corps to operate the System for flood control, navigation,
irrigation, power, water supply, water quality control, recreation, and fish and wildlife. Id. § 9. In
consultation with Tribes and States, the Corps developed a Master Water Control Manual (Master
Manual) to achieve integrated operation across six mainstream reservoirs and other federal
tributary reservoirs. NW. DIV., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSOURI RIVER MASTER WATER
CONTROL MANUAL I-1 (Mar. 1, 2006) [hereinafter MASTER MANUAL], available at
http://www nwd-mr.usace.army.mil/rcc/reports/mmanual/MasterManual.pdf.
5. Gibbs Holds Hearing to Examine 2011 Missouri River Flood, TRANSP. AND
INFRASTRUCTURE COMM. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://transportation house.gov/News/PRArticle.aspx?
NewsID=1466; 157 CONG. REC. D1292 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2011).
6. States, via local levee sponsors, operate and maintain one hundred percent of all MRB
levees. E-mail from Michael L. Beaird, Reg’l Emergency Manager, Nw. Div., U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, to author (Dec. 5, 2011, 10:14 PST) (on file with author) (including both federally and
privately constructed flood control works).
7. In a speech at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln on December 12, 2011, former
Nebraska Senator and Governor Bob Kerrey argued that a MRB compact would provide a better
way to manage the river. Kerrey: More Local Authority Needed over Missouri River Basin,
UNIV. OF NEB.-LINCOLN, INST. OF AGRIC. AND NAT. RESOURCES (Dec. 13, 2001),
http://ianrnews.unl.edu/static/1112130.shtml. In early August 2011, North Dakota Governor Jack
Dalrymple also argued that MRB States, through forming a compact, could better manage the
Missouri River than the Corps. Dalrymple: Take Missouri River Management Away from Corps,
BISMARCK TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2011), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/dalrymple-
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At present the Corps serves as a de facto river master,8 exercising
considerable authority in managing the System pursuant to the Flood
Control Act of 1944.9 Thus, any solution that grants States increased
authority to manage MRB water resources necessarily divests the Federal
government of some amount of managerial authority. In such an
arrangement, States will inevitably wade into areas of federal jurisdiction,
including flood control,10 navigation,11 and national security.12 Given this
danger, Congress will evaluate whether any proposed compact threatens
such federal interests13 and, if it consents to establishing a commission
charged with implementing the compact, whether a federal commissioner
could protect these interests.
Tribal leaders also argue the Corps is operating the System in a way
that threatens Indian reserved water rights.14 The great weight of such
present-perfected15 – but not yet quantified16 – reserved rights stymies the
development of water resources given the potential for insufficient supply

take-missouri-river-management-away-from-corps/article_a413d14e-ca80-11e0-ad97-001cc4c002
e0 html#ixzz1iLK87RVJ.
8. COMM. ON MO. RIVER ECOSYSTEM SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI
RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 35 (2002) [hereinafter MR
ECOSYSTEM].
9. Flood Control Act of 1944 § 9; see also South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d. 1014, 1027
(8th Cir. 2003) (“The Flood Control Act clearly gives a good deal of discretion to the Corps in the
management of the River.”); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 505 (1988)
(holding that the six mainstem reservoirs are under the control of the Corps such that even the
“Interior Secretary’s authority is subordinate to that of the Army Secretary”) (citing Act of Dec.
22, 1944 (Flood Control Act of 1944), ch. 665, § 4-6,8, 58 Stat. 887, 889-91).
10. See infra Part III.A. Beyond the six mainstem reservoirs, the Corps also owns, operates,
and maintains forty-four MRB reservoirs from its Kansas City and Omaha District offices.
WILLIAM K. JOHNSON & RICHARD J. DIBUONO, PR-19, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
AUTHORIZED AND OPERATING PURPOSES OF CORPS OF ENGINEERS RESERVOIRS 1, app. D at D-1
to D-2 (1994) (including those dam and reservoir, or lock and dam projects “for which water
control management is routinely required to control either water level, flow, or both”).
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
14. Charles Carvell, Indian Reserved Water Rights: Impending Conflict or Coming
Rapprochement Between the State of North Dakota and North Dakota Indian Tribes, 85 N.D. L.
REV. 1, 38 (2009) (observing the Corps “is regularly criticized for managing the river in a way
that disregards, if not undermines tribal water rights”).
15. Reserved water rights are considered present-perfected because, unlike rights perfected
under state law in a prior appropriation jurisdiction, they need not be applied to beneficial use
before the right is considered certified under state law. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
600 (1963); William Douglas Back & Jeffery S. Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug
on the Colorado River?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 77 n.32 (1980); JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED
STATES WATER LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 45 (2008); see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT § 533.030
(2011).
16. See Carvell, supra note 14, at 3.
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in relation to other established uses.17 Under the practicably irrigable
acreage standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Arizona
v. California,18 rough estimates indicate that the total amount of outstanding
reserved water rights is greater than the total available flow of the Missouri
River.19 Although the authors of the Model Interstate Water Compact
(Model Compact) suggest Tribes should not join a compact until after their
rights are quantified,20 this approach contributes to uncertainty, and
consequently undermines water rights under state law.21 While difficult to
envision in the wake of the recent 500-year flood, multiple factors may
ultimately reduce surface water supplies and, consequently, threaten Indian
reserved rights: downstream States argue for reduced reservoir volumes to
accommodate spring runoff in the face of increased precipitation
variability;22 oil and gas developers seek access to System water for oil and
gas development;23 and the ever present threat of transbasin diversions may
also reduce supplies.24 Because preserving reserved rights is intertwined
with protecting tribal sovereignty,25 compact drafters should reach out to
their sister sovereigns and accommodate tribal participation in any compact
commission authorized to make decisions affecting water availability.26 In
17. Id. at 50; see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.
1981) (noting that “open-ended water rights are a growing source of conflict and uncertainty in the
West” and that until they are settled “state-created water rights cannot be relied on by property
owners” (citations omitted)); N.D. STATE WATER COMM’N, 1983 STATE WATER PLAN, I-43
(stating that “reserved water rights create uncertainty” and, consequently, “water rights under
State law cannot be guaranteed”); FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, RED RIVER
VALLEY WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, app. J at 16-17, available at http://www.rrvwsp.com (finding
that quantification could affect Corps’ operations and the amount of water available to holders of
prior appropriative water rights under state law).
18. 460 U.S. 605, 617 (1983); see also infra note 111 and accompanying text.
19. Peter Capossela, Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Missouri River Basin, 6 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 131, 159 (2002) (citing ROY MCCALLISTER, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, NW. DIV., TREND DATA FOR THE USES AND RESOURCES OF THE MISSOURI RIVER
MAINSTEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM (1999)).
20. JEROME C. MUYS ET AL., MODEL INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT 27 (2009) [hereinafter
MODEL COMPACT].
21. See infra notes 13 and accompanying text.
22. Algis J. Laukaitis, Governors Along Missouri Ask for Lower Lake Levels, JOURNAL STAR
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/article_1ca13260-98655943-be4e-d4dd2b829259 html.
23. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
25. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Sovereignty and Intergovernmental Cooperation, in TRIBAL
WATER RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 13, 33 (John E.
Thorson et al. eds., 2006).
26. Negotiated settlement of conflicting claims to Indian rights is preferable to litigation. Id.
at 22, 25 (noting Congress adopted such an approach in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006)). Stakeholders recognize that federalism is “better
understood as a horizontal relationship among national, state, and tribal governments, each
exercising its inherent or delegated sovereign powers.” Id. at 31.
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addition, it is unrealistic to expect a federal commissioner to adequately
represent tribal interests in reserved water rights given the Federal
government’s conflicting interest in operating the System for other
competing uses.27 Finally, because the compact device provides each
sovereign with a means to quantify water rights through negotiation – or
elect to charge the compact commission with quantifying – it is essential
that Tribes be invited to participate in any compact negotiation.28
In spite of the state-centric nature of the compact device,29 with the
requisite tweaks, a MRB compact has the potential to accommodate each
sovereign’s competing interests in water resources. Though a tripartite
“federal-interstate-tribal” compact constitutes a departure from the “federalinterstate” approach, whereby a federal representative participates on an
operationally charged compact commission,30 there do not exist any express
constitutional hurdles to States compacting with Tribes or with the Federal
government.31 But it must be noted that the character of tribal-state
compacts differs from federal-interstate compacts.32 Whereas authority to
enter federal-interstate compacts springs from the Compact Clause,33
authority to enter tribal-state compacts arises from the organic law
27. See infra notes 217-23 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The author concedes that some tribal
members would prefer to litigate natural resources disputes because they believe that negotiating a
compact has the potential to undermine tribal sovereignty, vis-à-vis state sovereignty, and
compromise reserved water rights. Tsosie, supra note 25, at 33. But see Letter from Lawrin Hugh
Baker, Chairman, Nat. Res. Comm., Three Affiliated Tribes, to Joe Christie, Deputy to the Asst.
Sec’y for Indian Affairs (June 19, 1989) (“[T]he Tribes and the State both feel that mutually
acceptable water management is preferable to adjudication”) (quoted in Charles Carvell, Indian
Reserved Water Rights: Impending Conflict or Coming Rapproachement Between the State of
North Dakota and North Dakotan Indian Tribes, 85 N.D. L. REV. 1, 46 n.334 (2009)).
29. Of all the mechanisms available under the Constitution to manage interstate relations in
“supra-state” or “sub-federal” issues, the interstate compact is the most state-centric. CAROLINE
N. BROUN, ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 2
(2006) (listing mechanisms including regulation available under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Congress’ control over interstate commerce, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8;
Federal preemption doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; and the United
States Supreme Court’s power to exercise original jurisdiction over interstate disputes, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2).
30. See JEROME C. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT 388 (Nat’l Water Comm’n ed., 1971).
31. Examples of Tribes and States compacting exist in areas spanning tax collection and
cross-deputization, to detention of prisoners. Tsosie, supra note 25, at 32; see, e.g., State of
Montana-Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort Belknap Reservation-United States Water
Rights Compact. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2011); see also John H. Davidson, Indian
Water Rights, the Missouri River, and the Administrative Process: What Are the Questions?, 24
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (noting States, Tribes, and Congress may settle issues by
compact).
32. See Tsosie, supra note 25, at 32; see, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No.
87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961) (compacting States include Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania) [hereinafter Delaware Compact].
33. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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undergirding each sovereign, the treaty context, and the federal trust
responsibility.34 Therefore, while the federal system controls federal-state
interplay, and the federal trust responsibility controls federal-tribal
interplay, the compact device bridges the gap separating the familiar federal
system from the unique tribal context. As applied, an inter-sovereign
approach transforms the compact device into a tool that separate sovereigns
might use to manage shared MRB resources.35
The question then becomes whether the federal and tribal interests
implicated in a new inter-sovereign arrangement warrant equal
representation among federal, state, and tribal representatives to any
operationally charged compact commission. In describing how the compact
model balances power among sovereigns, Part II of this Article
acknowledges the efficacy of a “federal-interstate” approach – what is,
essentially, a second-generation (or ‘version 2.0’) water resources
management scheme – and explores how the Federal government might
safeguard its interests in any resultant compact commission. Part II also
acknowledges the need for compact drafters to allocate MRB waters among
sovereigns in the face of increasing consumptive uses and variability in
precipitation events. Part III analyzes the Federal government’s interests in
flood control and navigation in the face of reduced commercial shipping,
and the emerging link between agricultural production and national
security. Part IV explores the need for tribal participation on any compact
commission in light of outstanding Indian reserved water rights, and asserts
that tribal sovereignty itself implies joint responsibility in water resources
management decisions. The Article concludes that federal interests in flood
control, navigation, and national security call for equal federal participation
and tribal interests in reserved water rights and tribal sovereignty require
equal tribal participation.
II. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WATER COMPACT FOR THE
MISSOURI RIVER BASIN
Owing to its adaptability to regional nuances, an inter-sovereign
compact would provide a viable means to protect each sovereign’s interests

34. See Tsosie, supra note 25, at 32.
35. The author is mindful of the success of the Missouri River Association of States and
Tribes (MoRAST) in representing the interests of the States and Tribes in the MRB, but believes
the compact device – specifically, the administrative entity charged with implementing the terms
of a water compact – better accommodates each sovereign’s particular interests in managing water
resources. See MISSOURI RIVER ASSOCIATION OF STATES AND TRIBES, http://mo-rast.org/ (last
visited Dec. 5, 2012).
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in the development of MRB water resources.36 As a negotiated agreement
among signatories, compacts serve as both contract and statutory law and
provide a means for States to address supra-state or sub-national problems37
without directly encroaching on federal jurisdiction.38 Because the
Constitution conditions States’ ability to compact on Congress’ consent, the
United States has oversight over the final negotiated agreement.39 Although
consent transforms the compact into federal law, consent does not
ultimately transform a compact commission into a federal agency.40
Accordingly, courts treat commissions “not as creatures of the federal
government but rather creatures of the member states.”41 The United States
Supreme Court has expressed its preference for using compacts, rather than
litigation, to solve interstate disputes.42 As a practical matter, the compact
device presents a more realistic solution since the Court is unlikely to
accept jurisdiction over a claim to equitably allocate MRB waters in the

36. See Jerome C. Muys, Allocation and Management of Interstate Water Resources: The
Emergence of the Federal-Interstate Compact, 6 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 307, 314 (1976).
37. See Marguerite Ann Chapman, Where East Meets West in Water Law: The Formulation
of an Interstate Compact to Address the Diverse Problems of the Red River Basin, 38 OKLA. L.
REV 1, 99-100 n.621 (1985) (discussing the employ of interstate compact commissions to address
water quality problems that swell beyond the political geography of any one state).
38. BROUN ET AL., supra note 29, at 2-3. Also, because courts construe compacts as
contracts, States may not pass subsequent legislation that encumbers or impairs compact
obligations. Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Bridge Over Troubled Waters: The Application of State
Law to Compact Clause Entities, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 167 n.37 (2005).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 10, cl. 3. In practice, forming a compact involves three steps: (1)
Congress passes an act to authorize negotiations and often appoints a federal representative; (2)
representatives of participating States engage in negotiations, culminating in a draft compact; (3)
Congress consents to and legislatively approves the negotiated compact. C. Carter, Water Rights
in Interstate Streams, in 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER AND
ALLIED PROBLEMS § 133.2 (R. Clark ed., 1967).
40. BROUN ET AL., supra note 29, at 68. It is the individual terms and conditions that
determine which federal laws the commission must comply with. Id. The character of the
operational decisions of any MRB compact commission, especially in the context of complying
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006), or
immunity from takings claims under the Fifth Amendment, begs further analysis.
41. BROUN ET AL., supra note 29, at 69-70.
42. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945) (“Such controversies may appropriately
be composed by negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause . . . such mutual
accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of
invocation of our adjudicatory power.”); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921)
(describing the prudence of a compact to address pollution in New York Bay, “[such a problem] is
one more likely to be wisely solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual
concession . . . than by proceedings in any court, however constituted”); see also Felix Frankfurter
& James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution – A Study in Interstate Adjustments,
34 YALE L. J. 685, 707 (1925) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized its own inadequacy to give
relief. Continuous and creative administration is needed; not litigation, necessarily a sporadic
process, securing at best merely episodic and mutilated settlements, which leave the central
problems for adjustment unsolved.”).
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absence of greater development of water resources.43 While compacts take
many forms,44 two eastern compacts stand apart and establish a
comprehensive managerial regime: the Delaware River Basin Compact
(DRBC),45 and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact (SRBC).46 These
compacts employ the “federal-interstate” approach, whereby a
representative of the Federal government serves as a voting member of the
commission charged with implementing and enforcing the compact.
A. RESERVING A BROAD ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON
A MRB COMPACT COMMISSION
Despite the potential for state and tribal encroachment into areas of
federal jurisdiction,47 a compact, like the DRBC, that centralizes authority
in a regional compact commission provides effective water resources
management.48 For example, the DRBC commission’s operational mandate

43. Since the Court requires that there exist an actual controversy among states before it
exercises its original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006), the burden would be on
downstream states to demonstrate that upstream consumptive uses have harmed their interests in
developing water resources to such a degree as to constitute injury. Gene Olson, The O’MahoneyMilliken Amendments: The West Sinks the Navigation Power, 65 N.D. L. REV. 91, 93-95 (1989).
In twice denying South Dakota’s filing of an original action against lower MRB States, one
commenter posited that the Court found no active controversy existed. Id. at 93-94 (citing South
Dakota v. Nebraska, 475 U.S. 1093 (1986); South Dakota v. Nebraska, 108 S. Ct. 1071 (1988)).
Speaking of the “chicken-or-the-egg” dilemma, former South Dakota Governor William Janklow
described how private developers are hesitant to invest in water resources projects if the
availability of water is uncertain. Id. at 95. “Consequently . . . it is unlikely that any state will
allow an interstate water conflict to ripen to the point where the state can show by clear and
convincing evidence that it is suffering real and substantial injury or harm.” George William
Sherk, Equitable Apportionment After Vermejo: The Demise of a Doctrine, 29 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 565, 578 (1989).
44. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) classifies compacts as Coordination
and Cooperation, Limited Purpose, and Comprehensive Management. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL
ENG’RS, MODEL WATER SHARING AGREEMENTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4, 41, 84
(Stephen E. Draper ed., 2002). The type of compact is contingent on the location of parties to the
compact and when the compact was formed. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over
Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle Over the ‘Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828,
836 (2005).
45. Delaware Compact, supra note 32. The 1961 compact was preceded by a less
comprehensive compact. See Delaware River Basin Commission Compact, Pub. L. No. 82-573,
66 Stat. 738 (1952).
46. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970)
[hereinafter Susquehanna Compact].
47. See supra Part I.
48. State and federal DRBC commissioners expressed satisfaction and enthusiasm for the
actions of the commission. MUYS, supra note 30, at 189-90. The federal commissioner reported
“he felt ‘very strongly that a Federal-Interstate organization patterned after the Delaware can
accomplish coordinated and comprehensive river basin development better than an interstate
compact organization . . . .’” Id. at 199 (quoting Letter from U.S. Comm’r Paul M. Van Wegen to
Hon. James R. Smith, Asst. Sec’y for Water and Power Dev., Dep’t of the Interior 1 (Jan. 29,
1970)). “As to the federal-interstate compact approach, it was, and is, my enthusiastic conclusion
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is shared across federal and state commissioners.49 Federal participation is
useful in the DRB where the Corps owns and operates projects to protect
communities from flooding, provide water supply, and enhance water
quality and recreation.50 Indeed, the “heart” of the DRBC and SRBC is the
notion of centralizing authority at the regional level, where control of
federal projects is vested in the commission – in which the federal
representative has only one vote of five.51 In contrast, the Corps’ more
expansive role in operating the Missouri River Mainstem System52 suggests
the federal representative to a MRB compact commission should be entitled
relatively greater voting strength. Regarding the DRBC, the United States
only consented to the subordination of federal projects to the commission’s
comprehensive plan after compact drafters inserted a reservation
safeguarding the Federal government’s broader interests.53 Therefore,
Congress’ consent to a draft MRB compact is likely contingent on the
inclusion of a similar reservation of federal authority that safeguards
broader interests in flood control, navigation, and national security.

that the . . . [DRBC Commission] has compiled an impressive record.” Muys, supra note 36, at
313.
49. See generally Delaware Compact, supra note 32.
50. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PHILA. DIST., N. AK. DIV., http://www nap.usace.army.
mil/Missions/CivilWorks.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2012). Following the 1955 floods, the Corps
Constructed – and now operates – five dams in eastern Pennsylvania. Id. The commission, “as
agent for the states . . . acquire[s] the right to use and to control water supply facilities associated
with federal projects authorized in the Comprehensive Plan.” MUYS, supra note 30, at 171
(describing the policy as applied to the Tocks Island, Blue Marsh, and Trexler projects).
51. MODEL COMPACT, supra note 20, at 208-09. See Delaware Compact, supra note 32, §§
3.8, 11.1(b) (providing that the commission is authorized to review all projects having a
“substantial effect on the water resources of the basin” for inclusion in the “comprehensive plan”;
and the prohibition, relating to federal, state, and local projects, that “no expenditure or
commitment shall be made for or on account of the construction, acquisition or operation of any
project or facility nor shall it be deemed authorized, unless it shall have first been included . . . in
the comprehensive plan”).
52. See MR ECOSYSTEM, supra note 8, at 35.
53. MODEL COMPACT, supra note 20, at 154, 209 (describing the reservation at section
15.1(s), DRBC, as an “escape valve”). A member of the Federal Water Resources Council
summarized this arrangement:
[P]owers of Federal agencies under other existing or future law are not limited by the
compact except that such agencies are required to coordinate their comprehensive
planning through the commission and . . . they may not exercise powers conferred
under other law in a manner which substantially conflicts with a comprehensive plan
concurred in by the Federal member.
Id. at 211 (citing Hearings on a Susquehanna River Basin Compact before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
H. Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 102, 157 (1970)).
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B. SAFEGUARDING FEDERAL INTERESTS PRIOR TO AND POST MRB
COMPACT RATIFICATION
Assuming MRB compact drafters settle on a framework that divests the
Federal government of some amount of authority under the Flood Control
Act of 1944, the Federal government remains free to protect its interests
prior to and post ratification of the compact. First, Congress will carefully
evaluate the balance of power among sovereigns54 to ensure that drafters
include sufficient safeguards to protect federal interests implicated in
operating the System.55 This act of preserving federal authority is
somewhat similar to the Indian treaty context whereby treaties are construed
as preserving tribal authority, but for those rights granted to the United
States. In entering treaties, the United States effects a grant of rights from
the Tribes such that Tribes retain control of those rights not granted.56
Therefore, in a sense, congressional consent calls attention to States’ and
Tribes’ inherent sovereignty and capacity for self-government.
Yet, Congress’ limited power to consent under the Compact Clause
may be distinguished from its plenary power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause, post compact ratification. In Tobin v. United States57
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held consent does
not render an operational compact immune from subsequent congressional
supervision or constitutional constraints.58 Citing Congress’ plenary
powers in interstate commerce and national security, the court concluded it
has “abundant authority to supervise and regulate the activities of

54. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 521 (1893) (holding that congressional consent is
required for those compacts that might affect the distribution of political power between the States
and Federal government); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall, without the Consent
of Congress . . . enter into any . . . Compact with another State . . . .”). The Executive also retains
veto power over any legislative agreements that may jeopardize federal prerogatives. For
example, President Franklin Roosevelt vetoed an act granting consent to the Republican River
Compact because he believed the compact sought to “withdraw the jurisdiction of the United
States over the waters of the Republican Basin for purposes of navigation, and . . . to restrict the
authority of the United States to construct irrigation works and to appropriate water for irrigation
purposes in the basin.” 88 CONG. REC. 3286 (1942).
55. Under the Virginia v. Tennessee standard, a MRB compact will require consent given the
extensive federal projects and interests at issue in the basin; see Jerome C. Muys, Interstate
Compacts and Regional Water Resources Planning and Management, 6 NAT. RESOURCES L. 153,
174 (1973) (“[T]here is a very strong presumption that any compact or agreement dealing with
water resources is subject to the consent requirements of the compact clause.”).
56. In United States v. Winans, the Court referred indirectly to a larger group of retained
rights, including the right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places, and how the treaty
effected a grant of rights from the Indians – such that those rights not granted were reserved. 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
57. 306 F.2d 270 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
58. Tobin, 306 F.2d at 273.
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operational compacts” to protect “more compelling federal concerns.”59
Therefore, if Congress consents to a MRB compact that establishes an
operationally charged commission, Congress retains Commerce Clause
power to protect its interests – such power would, in turn, serve as a
backstop to greater state control of federal projects.60
C. A POTENTIAL FOR SCARCITY REQUIRES THAT THE COMPACT
ALLOCATE WATERS AMONG SOVEREIGNS
The hallmark of the compact device is its ability to address regionspecific challenges.61 And, true to the vision of John Wesley Powell,62 the
wisdom of managing water resources on a drainage basin-scale, impervious
to state jurisdictions, has withstood the test of time.63 Yet the greatest
obstacle to forming a MRB compact is reconciling the consumptive uses of
agriculture and industry in the upper arid basin, with the need to regulate
water for navigation and flood control to benefit the more humid lower
basin.64 Developers envision large municipal projects to divert water to
eastern North Dakota, southeastern and western South Dakota,
59. Id.
60. This is not to say that Congress’ plenary power subsumes that aspect of state sovereignty
exercised in implementing compact purposes. See Kevin J. Heron, The Interstate Compact in
Transition: From Cooperative State Action to Congressionally Coerced Agreements, 60 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 23 (1985) (quoting NAACP v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir.
1966) (“[T]he sovereignty of the States, within the boundaries reserved to them by the
Constitution, is one of the keystones upon which our government was founded and is of vital
importance to its preservation.”)).
61. See Muys, supra note 36, at 314.
62. Donald Worster, Watershed Democracy: Recovering the Lost Vision of John Wesley
Powell, 23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 57, 58 (2003).
63. See Janet Neuman, Are We There Yet? Weary Travelers on the Long Road to Water
Policy Reform, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 142-46 (2010) (chronicling various federal
commission recommendations from 1949 to 1998, each embracing a river basin commission
approach).
64. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 499-500 (1988). Managing the System
boils down to trade-offs. Observers note the “direct conflict between flood control and
navigation”: if the Corps were to evacuate more water from its system for flood control, it would
reduce that amount available for downstream barge operators and municipal water systems.
Helling & Canon, supra note 3 (quoting David Pope, Exec. Dir. of the Mo. River Ass’n of States
and Tribes (MoRAST)). The Executive Director of MoRAST cautioned that reducing the amount
of water stored for flood protection purposes would also adversely affect fishing guides and
motels dependent on the recreational fishing industry that relies on full reservoirs later in the year:
“You just make a bigger flood pool and have less water in the storage, for all the other uses . . . .
Those are really direct tradeoffs, and you can't have it both ways.” Id. In response to the
perception that the Corps’ support of fish and wildlife, an express purpose under the Flood
Control Act of 1944, exacerbated flood damage, Missouri Representative Sam Graves introduced
H.R. 2993 to prioritize flood control above all other system purposes, and remove fish and
wildlife as an authorized purpose. H.R. 2993, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011). See also South Dakota v.
Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d. 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the Flood Control Act of 1944,
58 Stat. 887, does not provide a metric to determine whether the Corps “correctly” balanced the
dominant functions of flood control and navigation against secondary purposes).
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northwestern Iowa, and southwestern Minnesota.65 States66 and Tribes67
seek access to System water for use in hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) to
develop oil and gas reserves in the prolific Bakken shale and Three Forks
formations in western North Dakota. Agricultural researchers recognize the
potential for downstream lands to produce biomass crops that would
stimulate local economies and reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil
fuels.68 Fortunately, MRB compact drafters maintain the flexibility to
quantify, negotiate, and ratify each sovereign’s rights to water by means of

65. Seth Tupper, Water Fight Brewing in South Dakota, DAILY REPUBLIC (Dec. 15, 2007),
http://www moafs.org/newsletter/April2008/water%20fight.htm (forecasting consumptive uses
including: greater irrigation attributed to increased corn production in response to sky-rocketing
ethanol prices; the development of significant diversion projects including the Lewis and Clark
Regional Water System, Red River Valley Water Supply Project, the Mni Wiconi Rural Water
System; and the Hyperion oil refinery at Elk Point, South Dakota which is forecasted to consume
up to 12 million gallons of water per day).
66. See S. Con. Res. 4002, 62d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011) (urging the Corps to
cede land that is riparian to the mainstem to North Dakota to improve access to water resources
for use in hydraulic fracturing); H.R. 1216, 62d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2011) (enacted)
(designating the use of hydraulic fracturing as “an acceptable recovery process”).
67. For example, the Missouri River Resources tribal energy company desires to capitalize
on hydraulic fracturing techniques to develop 500,000 billion barrels (Bbl) of oil and natural gas
reserves beneath tribal and allottee lands on the Fort Berthold Reservation, within the greater
Bakken/Three Forks oil bearing formation. MO. RIVER RES., 2010 BUSINESS PLAN 5 (2010),
http://www missouririverresources.com/files/MRR_Business_Plan.pdf.
But see James
MacPherson, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Bans Hydraulic Fracturing on Reservation,
BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 2, 2011, (describing a unanimous vote by the tribal council to ban
hydraulic fracturing on reservation land in advance of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA)
auction of leasing rights).
68. Megan Cassidy, MU Professor Helps to Plant Seeds for an Advanced Biofuel Economy,
MISSOURIAN (July 29, 2011), http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2011/07/28/biofuelcorridor/ (describing a plan by Shibu Jose, Director of Missouri University’s Center for
Agroforestry, to “create a corridor of sustainable biomass and biofuel production” in the Missouri
River floodplain); Frank M. Howell et al., Spatial Contours of Potential Biomass Crop
Production: An Examination of Variations by U.S. Region, 25 J. OF RURAL SOC. SCI. 1, 4-5
(2010) (identifying the North and South Plains as “lucrative” regions for switchgrass, and
referencing the Midwestern region’s potential for producing the “largest gross biomass yields”);
152 CONG. REC. H18 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006) (statement of Pres. George W. Bush) (outlining the
President’s goal of producing ethanol from switchgrass to reduce the nation’s dependence on
Middle Eastern oil); 153 CONG. REC. H882 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2007) (statement of Pres. George
W. Bush) (highlighting the President’s continued goal to produce ethanol from grasses). See also
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., A Federal Act to Promote Integrated Water Management: Is the CZMA
a Useful Model?, 42 ENVTL. L. 201, 223 (2012) (noting achievement of these energy goals is
dependent on “adequate and sustainable” water supplies); see also MASTER MANUAL, supra note
4, at IV-29 (illustrating that since only one-fifth of irrigable land is developed, the MRB can
expect increased water use in the future).
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the compact itself;69 or, punt the issue of negotiating water rights to the
respective compact commission.70
Addressing allocation within the compact framework is also crucial in
the face of increasing variability in precipitation events. In evacuating
water from System reservoirs for flood control during the fall, System
operators would need to keep tabs on the amount remaining and available to
satisfy each sovereign’s water rights during the summer.71 Such an
approach would mitigate the uncertainty that each sovereign’s consumptive
and non-consumptive uses might not be met during droughts.72 The epic
flood of 2011 was indicative of a new climatological “normal” that features
increased fluctuation of wet and dry periods and increased intensity in
precipitation events.73 This increased variability, and climate change’s role
in more intense precipitation events,74 illustrates the need for a flexible
69. For example, the State of Montana, the Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort
Belknap Reservation, and the United States entered into a compact to settle water rights claims of
the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation. MONT. CODE ANN. §
85-20-1001 (2011).
70. Excluding those water rights previously adjudicated by the Supreme Court, DRBC
drafters ultimately charged the compact commission with “work[ing] out” any permanent
consumptive use allocations among signatory States. MUYS, supra note 30, at 330.
71. The author hypothesizes that once amounts are allocated among sovereigns, the Corps’
Missouri River Basin Water Management Division could reserve such amounts in the “Carryover
Multiple Use” zone when preparing reservoir-specific annual operating plans (AOPs). See U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, GARRISON DAM/LAKE SAKAKAWEA PROJECT NORTH DAKOTA
SURPLUS WATER REPORT 2-6 to 2-8 (2010) [hereinafter SURPLUS WATER REPORT]. While the
engineering feasibility investigations designed to quantify System surplus water in the Garrison
Dam / Lake Sakakawea Surplus Water Report show it’s possible to earmark surplus water for
municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, this Article does not evaluate whether Section 6 of the Flood
Control Act of 1944 or the Water Supply Act of 1958 (Title III of Public Law 85-500—the 1958
River and Harbor Act) authorizes the Corps to reserve waters for specific States or Tribes. See
Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Asst. Sec’y of the Army of Civil Works, to the Dir. of Civil
Works 1-2 (May 8, 2012), available at http://www nwo.usace.army mil/html/pd-p/Plan_
Formulation/Review/ASA(CW)_Memorandum_Lake_Sakakawea_Surplus_Water_Report_08Ma
y12.pdf.
72. The relative abundance of water associated with the 2011 flood draws attention away
from the devastating effects of drought in the basin. For example, the drought of 1988 contributed
to insufficient water depth and shoals that stranded barges below St Louis, Missouri. Stanley A.
Changnon, The 1988 Drought, Barges, and Diversion, 70 BULL. OF THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL
SOC’Y 1092, 1092-94 (1989); see also Manoj Jha, et al., Impacts of Climate Change on
Streamflow in the Upper Mississippi River Basin: A Regional Climate Model Perspective, 109 J.
OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 1, 1 (2004). Emblematic of present meteorological variability, the
Great Flood of 1993 followed closely on the heels of the 1988 drought, costing the region eighteen
billion dollars. Id.
73. The streamflow record indicates that the MRB is transitioning into a period with “more
variability and extremes” with “larger outlier events.” REVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF THE
MISSOURI RIVER MAINSTEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM DURING THE FLOOD OF 2011, at 55 (2011),
available at http://www.nwd.usace.army mil/docs/MRIndependentReviewPanel.pdf (citing a 2011
written communication of David Garen, Natural Res. Conservation Serv.) [hereinafter
INDEPENDENT PANEL].
74. In light of studies suggesting that climate change is contributing to heavy precipitation
events, Tom Karl, Director of the National Climatic Data Center stated “[e]xtremes of
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management paradigm. In summary, although the MRB presently suffers
from the “paradox of conflict without scarcity,”75 the potential for such
scarcity requires that compact drafters address allocation.
III. FEDERAL INTERESTS CALLING FOR EQUAL PARTICIPATION
ON THE COMMISSION
Should MRB stakeholders ultimately support a compact approach to
manage water resources, the compact itself will need to accommodate
federal interests in flood control, navigation, and national security. Federal
courts have consistently held that the Federal government has a significant
interest in operating its projects for flood control purposes.76 Second, while
anemic commercial shipping on the Missouri River might entitle MRB
States to divest the Federal government of some operational functions, the
Corps retains significant authority under the Commerce Clause and Flood
Control Act of 1944 to manage the System for navigation purposes.77
Finally, proper operation of the System itself is crucial to sustaining
agricultural production that, in terms of food security, has the potential to
impact the Federal government’s interest in national security.78 For each of
these reasons, it is imperative that any commission charged with
administering a MRB compact includes a federal representative who can
speak to these significant interests.
A. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S DOMINANT INTEREST IN
FLOOD CONTROL
In their quest to divest the Corps of some amount of managerial
authority, MRB States will inevitably wade into areas of federal
responsibility for multipurpose projects involving flood control and
navigation. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Flood
Control Act of 1944 vests the lion’s share of responsibility for System

precipitation are generally increasing because the planet is actually warming, and more water is
evaporating from the oceans.” David Kroodsma, Track the Nation’s Rivers: Missouri River
Floods and Southern Drought, CLIMATE CENTRAL (June 20, 2011), http://www.climatecentral.org
/blogs/track-the-nations-rivers-floods-in-the-north-drought-in-the-south/. Mr. Call concluded this
pattern “allows snow and rain events ‘to become more extensive and intense’ [than they otherwise
would be].” Id.
75. In charting MRB States’ inability to agree on a permanent allocation or management
scheme, Professor Tarlock succinctly described the present “paradox of conflict over absolute
abundance rather than scarcity.” A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of Conflict
Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 1-2 (1997).
76. See infra Part III.A.
77. See infra Part III.B.
78. See infra Part III.C.
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operation with the Corps.79 The Corps’ unenviable role of operating the
System for multiple purposes can be traced to Congress’ announcement of
an integrated flood-control policy in the Flood Control Act of 1936.80 This
Act affirmed the notion that flood control was principally a federal activity
but was executed “in cooperation with the States, their political
subdivisions, and localities thereof.”81 Congress expanded this policy of
federal-state coordination in section 1 of the Flood Control Act of 1944
when it “recognize[d] the interests and rights of the States in determining
the development of the watersheds within their borders and likewise their
interests and rights in water utilization and control.”82
Today, MRB States can either pursue a frontal attack against this
bulwark of federal control by championing a purely interstate compact
whose charter might supersede the Flood Control Act of 1944, or launch a
flanking attack by exploiting the ‘state interests’ seams in section 1 of the
Act.83 Regarding the latter method, States might argue section 1 of the
Flood Control Act of 194484 evinces a congressional intent to broaden state
authority, vis-à-vis federal authority, over flood control works. In terms of
water resources development, Clifford H. Stone, past director of the
Colorado Water Conservation Board, testified that section 1 “placed a real
responsibility on the states.”85 And in the water rights context, the Corps
has observed that section 1(b) of the Flood Control Act of 1944 protects and
recognizes rights perfected under state law, such that the use of water for
79. See In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 418 F.3d.
915, 918-20 (8th Cir. 2005).
80. IRA G. CLARK, WATER IN NEW MEXICO: A HISTORY OF ITS MANAGEMENT AND USE
260 (1987); see also Act of June 22, 1936 (Flood Control Act of 1936), ch. 688, §§ 1-5, 49 Stat.
1570, 1570–72 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2006)). Announcing “the Federal Government
should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries,
including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes” and “destructive floods upon the rivers
of the United States, upsetting orderly processes and causing loss of life and property, including
the erosion of lands, and impairing and obstructing navigation, highways, railroads, and other
channels of commerce between the States, constitute a menace to national welfare.” Id. § 1.
81. Flood Control Act of 1936 §1. The Act also established a policy of expanding local
control by delegating the operation and maintenance of flood control works in exchange for
federal funds. Id. § 3.
82. Act of Dec. 22, 1944 (Flood Control Act of 1944), ch. 665, § 1, 58 Stat. 887, 887-89.
Acknowledging state interests was intended to quash a growing anti-federal sentiment that arose
in response to greater federal control of water resources – whereby the Federal government under
its Commerce Clause power was allegedly “stripping appropriative-doctrine [S]tates of their
authority to administer unappropriated waters in the best interests of those [S]tates.” CLARK,
supra note 80, at 566-67. States also sought a “veto” power over any federal projects that they
found objectionable. JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA 102 (1993).
83. See Flood Control Act of 1944 § 1.
84. Id.
85. FERRELL, supra note 82, at 101-02 (quoting statement of C.H. Stone, Dir., Co. Water
Conservation Bd., to President’s Mo. Basin Survey Comm. (MBSC), Nov. 17, 1952) (quotations
omitted).
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navigation is subordinate to the use of water for “beneficial consumptive
uses” in western states.86 Finally, in the planning context, the Act requires
federal agencies to submit plans or proposals “to affected states for their
views and recommendations.”87 But by no means does the Flood Control
Act of 1944 confer any power upon States to approve or disapprove federal
projects.88 It follows that to effect a rebalancing of power among
sovereigns, States will need to rely on Congress to either (1) amend the
Flood Control Act of 1944, or (2) consent to a compact that supersedes the
Act.
Also, federal courts have consistently upheld the Federal government’s
dominant interest in operating multipurpose projects for flood control.89
For example, only four years after Congress passed the Flood Control Act
of 1936, the Supreme Court concluded the Federal government’s authority
over “flood protection” is “as broad as the needs of commerce.”90 And the
Court has held in instances when a federal flood control program is in
conflict with a state program, “the latter must yield.”91 More recently, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Corps enjoys significant discretion
in operating the System in accordance with the Master Manual. 92 In In re
Operation of the Missouri River System Litigation v. Corps (System
Litigation)93 the Eighth Circuit held the Corps’ duty to balance the
dominant purposes of flood protection and navigation against secondary
purposes under the Flood Control Act of 1944 preempted North Dakota’s
efforts to force the Corps to comply with state water quality standards. 94
86. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, EP 1165-2-1, WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND
AUTHORITIES—DIGEST OF WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES 18-7 (July 1999)
(discussing the O’Mahony-Milliken Amendment to the Flood Control Act of 1944, H.R. 4485,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944)).
87. Report of the Special Master re Winter Storage Motions at 348, Kansas v. Colorado, 533
U.S. 1 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.) (Sept. 15, 1989) (quoting Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, §
1(a) and (c), 58 Stat. 887, 887-89).
88. Id.
89. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940); Okla.
ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534-35 (1941); In re Operation of the Mo.
River Sys. Litig. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 418 F.3d. 915, 918-20 (8th Cir. 2005).
90. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 427.
91. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. at 534-35 (explaining that even if the federal dam and
reservoir interferes with state water development and conservation, the “[state] program must bow
before the superior power of Congress”) (internal quotation marks removed).
92. In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d. at 918-20.
93. 418 F.3d. 915 (8th Cir. 2005).
94. In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d. at 918-20. The court also held that
the Clean Water Act’s “Navigation Exception,” at 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a), preserved the United
States’ sovereign immunity in maintaining downstream navigation uses. Id. at 917-20. Of course,
the Corps must still operate the System in accordance with the reasonable and prudent alternatives
(RPAs) outlined in the 2003 amendments to the 2000 biological opinion, under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006). Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271
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Therefore, until Congress redistributes power via legislation or a compact,
the Corps remains at the helm, serving as the de facto river master in
operating the System for multiple purposes under the Flood Control Act of
1944.
B. AN ENTRENCHED NAVIGATION MANDATE, UNMINDFUL OF
REDUCED COMMERCIAL SHIPPING
Before the Missouri River Bank Stabilization and Navigation Project95
and the System transformed the river’s braided channel geometry into a
uniform 1,100-kilometer (km) channel,96 historians considered steamboat
navigation on the Missouri River to be more dangerous than on any other
river.97 Corps responsibility for navigation in the MRB began with the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890,98 in which Congress tasked the Secretary
of War with regulating the construction of projects that had the potential to
impair navigation.99 Congress authorized separate studies in 1917,100
F. Supp. 2d. 230, 252-53 (D.D.C. 2003). See generally U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., 2003
AMENDMENT TO THE 2000 BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE OPERATION OF THE MISSOURI RIVER
MAIN STEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM, OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MISSOURI RIVER
BANK STABILIZATION AND NAVIGATION PROJECT, AND OPERATION OF THE KANSAS RIVER
RESERVOIR SYSTEM (2003) [hereinafter 2003 BIOP]. For example in American Rivers, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined the Corps from deviating from its
Master Manual in the face of potential disruption to downstream navigation during the
recommended summer low flow period. 271 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53 (holding the Corps has
“sufficient discretion” to consider its ESA duties even if such compliance “come[s] at the expense
of other interests, including navigation and flood control”).
95. See Act of July 25, 1912 (River and Harbors Act of 1912), ch. 253, 37 Stat. 201
(authorizing a six foot depth from Kansas City to the river's mouth); Act of Aug. 8, 1917 (River
and Harbor Act of 1917), ch. 49, 40 Stat. 250 (extending navigation channel to Quindaro Bend,
near Kansas City); Act of Mar. 3, 1925 (River and Harbor Act of 1925), 43 Stat. 1186 (expanding
the channel width to 200 feet from Kansas City to the mouth of the Missouri River); Act of Jan.
21, 1927 (River and Harbor Act of 1927), ch. 47, 44 Stat. 1010 (extending the navigation channel
to Sioux City); Act of Mar. 2, 1945 (River and Harbor Act of 1945), ch. 2, 59 Stat. 10 (authorizing
a navigation channel nine foot in depth and three hundred foot in width).
96. ARTHUR C. BENKE & COLBERT E. CUSHING, RIVERS OF NORTH AMERICA 438 (2005).
97. 4 SEYMOUR DUNBAR, A HISTORY OF TRAVEL IN AMERICA 1149 (1915) (describing the
Missouri River pilot as “the most skillful representative of his profession”). See HIRAM MARTIN
CHITTENDEN, HISTORY OF EARLY STEAMBOAT NAVIGATION ON THE MISSOURI RIVER: LIFE AND
ADVENTURES OF JOSEPH LA BARGE 115 (1903). Regarding the danger of whirlpools, one author
described:
[T]he whirl of the water was so swift that the center of the eddy was nearly twelve feet
below its circumference. The boat was trying to pull itself by with a line when it was
caught by the eddy, swung out into the stream, whirled violently around and careened
over until the river flowed right across the lower deck.
Id. at 122-23.
98. Act of Sept. 19, 1890 (River and Harbor Act of 1890), Pub. L. No. 51-907, § 6, 26 Stat.
593-96.
99. Id.; CLARK, supra note 80, at 138. Later, amendments to the General Dam Act of 1906
partially constrained the Corps’ purview of waterway improvement activities but indicated that
authority for the regulations rested on the Federal government’s power over navigation. CLARK,
supra note 80, at 144; see also General Dam Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 246, 36 Stat. 593-96.
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1927,101 and 1928102 to evaluate: (1) the benefits to navigation and
agriculture from flood control projects that reduced erosion and siltation,
(2) revenues attributed to the use of reservoir waters, and (3) whether such
waters should be made available to public and private use, respectively.103
These studies culminated in the Flood Control Act of 1936,104 which
announced an integrated flood-control policy that embraced navigation,
among other benefits.105
The Supreme Court has held that improving navigation through flood
control is a valid exercise of power under the Commerce Clause.106
Further, in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.107 the Court
held the “exercise of the authority conferred on Congress” is not
constrained even if the waterway was non-navigable at the project site.108
Another example of the Federal government’s considerable power under the
Commerce Clause is the application of the navigation servitude, whereby
the government can impair or destroy interests in private property in acts
incidental to the regulation of navigable waters, without having to pay just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.109 Therefore, in distributing
power across representatives to a commission, federal control of
multipurpose projects is premised on purposes incidental to the navigation
power.110

100. Act of Mar. 1, 1917 (Flood Control Act of 1917), ch. 144, 39 Stat. 948, 950 (codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 643, 701-703 (2006)).
101. Act of Jan. 21, 1927, ch. 47, § 10, 44 Stat. 1010, 1010-21; see also Act of May 15, 1928
(Flood Control Act of 1928), ch. 569, § 10, 45 Stat. 534, 538 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 702(j)
(2006)) (providing that the Secretary of War should submit to Congress “at the earliest practicable
date projects for flood control on all tributary streams of the Mississippi River system”).
102. Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534, 538.
103. CLARK, supra note 80, at 259.
104. Act of June 22, 1936 (Flood Control Act of 1936), ch. 688, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 701a, 701f, 701h (2006)).
105. CLARK, supra note 80, at 260.
106. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940).
107. 313 U.S. 508, 516, 533-34 (1941).
108. Guy F. Atkinson Co, 313 U.S at 533-34.
109. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124 (1967). In essence, a property owner’s
interest in land riparian to navigable water “is a qualified title, a bare technical title, not at his
absolute disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at all times subordinate to such use . . . as may be
consistent with or demanded by the public right of navigation.” Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S.
141, 163 (1900). For when Congress “appropriates the flow either of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant to its superior power under the Commerce Clause, it is exercising
established prerogatives and is beholden to no one.” United States v. Grand River Dam Auth.,
363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960).
110. See CLARK, supra note 80, at 557.
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Although the Corps still prioritizes navigation above competing uses in
operating the System pursuant to the Flood Control Act of 1944, 111 and
maintains a nine foot deep and three hundred foot wide commercial
navigation channel pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945,112 both
the total navigation tonnage and its market value are at record lows.113 The
rapid decline in the value of goods shipped on the Missouri River is
primarily due to the fact that shipments of relatively inexpensive sand and
gravel now dwarfs those of all other commercial goods.114 In addition,
though barge traffic serves four States,115 commercial navigation is
constrained to the lowest reach of the river.116 In sum, while the Corps
retains significant authority to support navigation under the Commerce
Clause117 and Flood Control Act of 1944,118 for all practical purposes,
commercial navigation usage is a shadow of its former steam-powered self.
Therefore, Congress might endorse a compact framework that divests some
111. See In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 418
F.3d 915, 919-20 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (8th
Cir. 2003)); Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887.
112. Pub. L. No. 79-14, ch. 19, 59 Stat. 10 (1945).
113. By 2011, total navigation tonnage fell to 4 million (from a previous high of 9.73 million
in 2001); total tonnage value based on 2011 present worth fell to just above $100MM (from a
previous high of $1.37BB in 1977); total commercial tonnage fell to 0.1 million (from a previous
high of 3.34 million in 1977); present total commercial tonnage value fell to approximately
$90MM (from a previous high of $1.33BB in 1977). JOHN LARANDEAU, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, MISSOURI RIVER COMMERCIAL TONNAGE 1960-2011 AND 2011 PRESENT WORTH
TONNAGE VALUE 1960-2011 (2011) (acknowledging that 2011 values are an estimate only and
not yet confirmed by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center)
(presentation on file with author).
114. JOHN LARANDEAU, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MISSOURI RIVER NAVIGATION
TONNAGE 1935-2011 (2011) (showing that between 2003 and 2009 sand and gravel accounted for
over 90% of all commercial tonnage) (spreadsheet on file with author). For comparison purposes,
farm products (corn and soybeans) accounted for less than one percent of commercial tonnage in
2010. Id. (2010 data is in a preliminary state). But as a function of river miles travelled, sand and
gravel accounts for a de minimis amount since a majority of it is mined directly from the river and
processed at adjacent facilities. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-224R, DATA ON
COMMODITY SHIPMENTS FOR FOUR STATES SERVED BY THE MISSOURI RIVER AND TWO STATES
SERVED BY BOTH THE MISSOURI AND MISSISSIPPI RIVERS 7 fig. 4 (2009) (showing fifty-four
percent was transported one mile or less) [hereinafter GAO NAVIGATION REPORT].
115. Below Sioux City, Iowa, the Missouri River forms the border between Iowa and
Nebraska and the border between Kansas and Missouri, before merging with the Mississippi River
below St Louis, Missouri. GAO NAVIGATION REPORT, supra note 114, at 2 fig.1.
116. Id.at 3 fig. 1 (showing Missouri commanded 83% of the total tonnage between 1994
and 2006).
117. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause also allows Congress to regulate
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005) (holding
Congress may regulate so long as the activity still “bears a substantial relation to commerce”).
Therefore, the Commerce Clause still allows Congress – should it desire – to regulate the
“channels of interstate commerce” despite how narrow, shallow, or unoccupied they might be.
118. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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amount of authority to maintain the navigation channel away from the
Corps and vest it in an operationally charged compact commission.
C. EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS CALLS FOR
ROBUST FEDERAL PARTICIPATION
A link between agricultural production in the Missouri River floodplain
and the Federal government’s interest in national security is beginning to
emerge. Proper operation of System reservoirs is critical to safeguarding
fertile bottomlands that are responsible for producing much of the nation’s
food. Coordinating operation of System reservoirs to accommodate
snowmelt and rainfall over one-sixth of the lower forty-eight’s landmass
requires a centralized command and control system119 that States, by
themselves, would have difficulty establishing.120 Accurately predicting
streamflow values from large meteorological datasets is critical to
preventing the deposition of sand and silt atop cropland that is responsible
for producing forty-six percent of the wheat, thirty-four percent of the
cattle, and twenty-two percent of the corn in the United States.121
Such significant agricultural production implicates national security
concerns. First, food availability – in essence, a “sufficient quantit[y] of
food available on a consistent basis” – is a major component of food
security.122 And food security bears heavily on national security in both the

119. “[T]o achieve the multi-purpose benefits . . . the six System reservoirs must be operated
as a hydraulically and electrically integrated system.” MASTER MANUAL, supra note 4, at I-1.
For example, the Independent Panel, charged with reviewing Corps operation of the System
during the historic 2011 flood, noted the need for “improved data infrastructure and incorporation
of scientific modeling tools” to estimate runoff attributed to Great Plains snowmelt.
INDEPENDENT PANEL, supra note 73, at 4.
120. See FERRELL, supra note 82, at 101 (describing how States have historically struggled
to assume a larger role in regional resources development due to a lack of money and manpower).
121. Brian Kahn, Missouri River Flood Drama Likely Took Direction from La Nina,
CLIMATE WATCH MAGAZINE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.climatewatch noaa.gov/article/2011/
missouri-river-flood-drama-likely-took-direction-from-la-nina. Of the approximately 1.4 million
acres of agricultural land in the MRB that is subject to flooding, tribal land comprises
approximately 42,800 acres, or three percent of the total land in production. MASTER MANUAL,
supra note 4, at IV-17.
122. The World Health Organization (WHO) considers “food availability” as one of three
pillars supporting “food security.” Food Security, WHO, http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/
story028/en/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2012). The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA)
working definition of “food security” is “access by all people at all times to enough food for an
active, healthy life.” Briefing Rooms, USDA, ECONOMIC RES. SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Briefing/FoodSecurity/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2012). In the United States, 14.5% of households
(17.2 million households) were food insecure at some point during 2010. ALISHA COLEMANJENSEN, ET AL., ERR-125, USDA, HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2010
4 (2011), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/Err125/. Perhaps more importantly,
since 1998, the percentage of food insecure households in the United States has generally risen,
from 11.8% in 1998 to a high of 14.7% in 2009. Id. at 6 tbl. 1A.
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international123 and domestic context.124 In essence, a country’s ability – or
inability – to produce food has important security implications. For
example, a country’s ability to produce food lends it a considerable strategic
advantage in the embargo and economic sanction settings.125 And the most
direct link between food security and national security simply boils down to
a nation-state’s ability to feed its armed forces.126 As applied to the MRB,
the United States’ ability to project power, in a military sense,127 is
premised on robust agricultural production. Accordingly, a dramatic
decrease in crop or livestock production in a time of war could adversely
affect national security.128
Therefore, it is important the Federal
government retain an equal amount of control over System operations in a
MRB compact arrangement to safeguard its interest in national security.

123. In October of last year, Vice President Biden remarked “[i]nvestments made to ward off
food insecurity and prevent its recurrence can prevent the vicious cycles of rising extremism,
armed conflict, and state failure that can require far larger commitments of resources down the
road.” Jonathan Shrier, Food Security Contributes to National Security, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(Oct. 28, 2011), http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/food_ national_security/ (describing
how food security is inextricably linked to national security). Also, in urging Congress to
continue funding programs such as the Food for Peace Program that distributes United States
grown commodities to people enduring natural and manmade disasters, Representative McGovern
expressed “[t]his isn’t a question of charity. It’s an issue of national security, of what happens
when desperate people can’t find or afford food, and the anger that comes from people who see no
future for their children except poverty and death.” 157 CONG. REC. H1397 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
2011) (statement of Rep. McGovern). “Strategists need to understand that the world food supply
is a global challenge that bears most heavily on the peace and prosperity of the international
system.” Lief R. Rosenberger, Towards Food Security, in 3 U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND-ASIA
PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE 52, 65 (2005). The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS) hosted a seminar on Food Security that highlighted the evolving notion of “national
security” that now includes “non-military threats to the welfare of the nation-state.” Food
Security and Political Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region, APCSS (Sept. 11, 1998),
http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Report_Food_Security_98 html [hereinafter APCSS Seminar].
124. One military scholar put it succinctly, “food — who has it, who doesn't — and the
arable land from which it is produced become legitimate strategic considerations.” Leif R.
Rosenberger, The Strategic Importance of the World Food Supply, 27 Parameters US Army War
College Quarterly 84, 85 (Spring 1997). Despite the complexity of the global food supply system,
Mr. Rosenberger notes that the amount of arable land in cultivation bears on national security
issues. Rosenberger, supra note 123, at 56.
125. Seminar participants described how food may be used as a weapon, hypothesizing that
“China’s growing dependence on the United States as a provider of food (particularly grain) may
temper Beijing’s often turbulent relations with Washington, which are often dominated by
contentious disagreements on a number of policy questions.” APCSS Seminar, supra note 123.
126. Id. (noting the importance of food to soldier morale and exhaustion).
127. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines “power projection” as “[t]he ability of a
nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power – political, economic, informational,
or military – to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed
locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”
DOD, THE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 254 (2010).
128. APCSS Seminar, supra note 123.
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IV. TRIBAL INTERESTS REQUIRING EQUAL PARTICIPATION ON
THE COMPACT COMMISSION
In addition to federal representation, it is equally important that a tribal
representative participate in administering the compact in order to protect
the interrelated issues of Indian reserved water rights129 and tribal
sovereignty.130 Although tribal participation in compacts has historically
been limited to those Tribes with quantified reserved water rights, the
potential for non-Indian consumptive uses to adversely affect Indian rights
requires that compact drafters afford equal representation to potentially
affected Tribes.131 Moreover, since it is not yet known whether state and
federal courts in the MRB will embrace recent decisions acknowledging
that Indian reserved water rights extend to groundwater sources, it is
paramount that Tribes be afforded a forum in which to protect their present
and future consumptive uses in groundwater.132 Finally, the concept of
tribal sovereignty itself – and the Federal government’s conflict of interest
between operating the System for competing purposes and its fiduciary duty
to protect tribal resources – implies participation in MRB water resources
management activities.133

129. State water agencies estimate that potential Indian reserved water rights could amount
to approximately 8.6 million acre-feet of water per year (MAF/yr) against the average flow of
fifty-seven MAF/yr measured at the mouth of the Missouri River. MO. RIVER BASIN STATES
ASS’N, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN HYDROLOGY FINAL REPORT 1–8 (1983) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT]; see also John E. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through Intergovernmental Agreements:
The Pros and Cons of Negotiated Settlements, in 8 INDIAN WATER 25, 27 (1986). Estimates by
State: Montana, 6.6 MAF/yr; Nebraska, 26.5 thousand acre-feet/yr (TAF/yr); North Dakota, 190
TAF/yr; South Dakota, 1.3 MAF/yr; Wyoming, 477 TAF/yr; Kansas is not included. Id. at 1-3.
For comparison purposes, experts believe the Navajo Nation may be entitled to two MAF/yr of the
more than fifteen MAF/yr in outstanding western reserved water rights. Karen Crass, Eroding the
Winters Right: Non-Indian Water Users’ Attempt to Limit the Scope of the Indian Superior
Entitlement to Western Water to Prevent Tribes from Water Brokering, 1 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 109, 119-20 (1997).
130. The idea that Tribe’s enjoy a sovereignty that entitles them to a degree of control in
managing Missouri River water resources, also finds support in the related concept of “water
sovereignty,” whereby Tribes have “the right to develop and manage their own water resources to
appropriately meet the needs of their people.” Dena Marshall & Janet Neuman, Seeking a Shared
Understanding of the Human Right to Water: Collaborative Use Agreements in the Umatilla and
Walla Walla Basins of the Pacific Northwest, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 361, 370-71 (2011).
131. See infra Part IV.A.
132. See infra Part IV.A.
133. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS PRESENT THE GREATEST
OBSTACLE TO COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
Tribal development of not-yet-quantified Indian reserved water rights
has the potential to affect how the System is managed134 for downstream
navigation135 and other uses, such as that amount available to satisfy
downstream water right holders.136 In addition, Tribes are presently making
consumptive use of Missouri River water for domestic, industrial, and
agricultural use.137 Therefore, even though including a tribal representative
on any compact commission prior to the quantification of reserved rights
constitutes a departure from compacting practice,138 Tribes should have a
voice in decisions that may adversely affect their ability to make beneficial
use of reserved water on over 18.4 million acres of reservation land in the
MRB.139
Speaking to the importance of reserved rights to upper basin Tribes,
one author stated they are “the basis for their continued existence as a
separate and distinct people.”140 But it must be noted certain tribal

134. Richard Bad Moccasin of the Mni Sose Tribal Water Rights Coalition suggested that
“allocating some of the reservoirs’ storage capacity for Indian purposes might be a physical
solution for tribes when other means of preserving, protecting, and developing Indian water rights
are impractical or are foreclosed.” Tribes Voice Views Over Missouri River, U.S. WATER NEWS
ONLINE (June 1995), http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcrights/5tribes html.
135. By 1997, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources determined tribal use of Indian
reserved water rights for out of basin diversions has the potential to “ultimately reduce the flow of
the river through the State of Missouri, to the point where its many benefits would be severely
reduced.” 6 JERRY D. VINEYARD, MO. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., WATER RESOURCE SHARING:
THE REALITIES OF INTERSTATE RIVERS 23 (1997), available at http://www.dnr mo.gov/env/wrc/
statewaterplanPhase1 htm#WRS (referencing tribal efforts to pursue water marketing – in essence,
transferring water across basin boundaries for profit).
136. The United States Supreme Court has applied the reserved rights doctrine “as an
exception to Congress’s deference to state water law.” In re Gen. Adj. of All Rights to Use Water
in Gila River Sys. and Source (Gila River I), 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (citing
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 714 (1978)).
137. Senator Conrad acknowledged Tribes’ fears that federal water supply contracts with
downstream users creates a situation that will “make it impossible for [Tribes] to access water for
present and future uses.” Impact Suffered by the Tribes in the Upper Basin of the Missouri River:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 22 (2003) (statement of Sen. Kent
Conrad of North Dakota, Member, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs). Senator Tim Johnson also
recognized “a certain use it or lose it dynamic,” suggesting that by the time Congress determines
how much water is needed for the Tribes it will have to “undo previous commitments” and, at that
point, it will “get very complicated.” Id.; see also SURPLUS WATER REPORT, supra note 71
(noting that, while not yet critical in terms of total volume, “numerous irrigators withdraw water
directly from the reservoirs and downstream river reaches”).
138. See MODEL COMPACT, supra note 20, at 89-90.
139. See JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF
MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 47 (1994) (showing such land comprises six percent of the 328
million acres in the MRB).
140. William H. Veeder, Indian Water Rights in the Upper Missouri River Basin, 48 N.D. L.
REV. 617, 618 (1972).
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constituencies oppose entering into a compact to quantify outstanding
reserved water rights for several reasons. First, in light of the traditional
view of the interconnectedness of water and land, some tribal members fear
allocation constitutes a concession to the Federal government’s supreme
interest in Missouri River water and all the land west of it in South
Dakota.141 Therefore, such a concession could adversely impact the Tribe’s
outstanding claim against the United States for the land within the Black
Hills of South Dakota that was reserved for the Great Sioux Nation by the
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868.142 Second, other tribal constituencies fear that
entering into a state-centric compact would validate the perception that
States have the authority to allocate water rights to sovereign Tribes.143
Third, Tribes are fearful that quantification would fail to take into account
potential future development on the reservations.144 Finally, present
abundance fosters a sense of complacency that may ultimately jeopardize
limited groundwater and surface water sources.145
One hundred and five years ago the United States Supreme Court
announced the “Great Charter” of Indian reserved water rights in Winters v.
United States,146 where the Court held the act of reserving land also
impliedly reserved a sufficient quantity of water to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation. Most importantly, the priority date of the reserved water

141. Tribes Hold Wild Cards in Missouri River Water Fight, NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY
(Dec. 2007), http://indiancountrynews net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2188&
Itemid=33.
142. Id. (“We can’t quantify unless the outstanding land claims have been settled.” (quoting
Robert Quiver, Jr., resident of the Pine Ridge Reservation)). Robert Quiver, Jr. also serves as
Executive Director of the Great Plains Tribal Water Alliance, an organization formed by the
Standing Rock, Oglala, and Rosebud Sioux Tribes in response to the view that the Mni Sose InterTribal Water Rights Coalition was no longer effective at furthering the Coalition’s original
purpose.
STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE – DEP’T OF WATER RES.,
http://www.standingrocktreatywater.com/projects/view.asp?ID=9 (last visited Dec. 5, 2012)).
143. Tupper, supra note 65 (“[Allocation] begins to talk about sovereignty and control
factors that I don’t believe we can give away.” (quoting Michael Jandreau, Chairman, Lower
Brule Sioux Tribe)).
144. Id. (considering that present water availability may “turn out to be inadequate decades
into the future”); see also Carvell, supra note 14, at 48 (“[T]he Standing Rock Sioux has
repeatedly stated that it is not interested in any process by which its water right might be
quantified, and, in fact, expressly opposes the idea.”).
145. Carvell, supra note 14, at 50 (“The Standing Rock Sioux and Three Affiliated Tribes
are content to leave their water rights unquantified, believing that those rights are secure and that
the water, particularly that of Missouri River, will be there on that day when they call for it.”).
146. 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). In addition to a Winters right, a Tribe might also have an
aboriginal water right for uses existing prior to the establishment of the reservation (e.g., instream
flow for wildlife) with an immemorial priority date. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414
(9th Cir. 1983).

2012]

INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT

123

right is the date on which the United States established the reservation.147
Thus, in the event a particular water source is over appropriated, the holder
of any junior right that was perfected under state law after the government
established the reservation would have to curtail her usage until the holder
of the senior reserved water right could satisfy her water right.148
Vacillating federal policy on tribal sovereignty is partly responsible for
the unsettled state of Indian reserved water rights in the MRB.149 Present
incongruities between adjudicated amounts and the actual needs of Tribes,
combined with States’ efforts to establish a “blanket formula” to quantify
such rights, fosters uncertainty.150 These rights may be quantified during
(1) litigation in general stream adjudication in state court,151 (2) negotiated
settlement approved by a federal trustee,152 (3) congressionally ratified
tribal-state compact,153 or (4) federal legislation.154 But MRB Tribes tend
to be wary of state quantification efforts and see them as attempts to
minimize their rights in light of the undeveloped condition of Indian
water.155
The presumptive method by which Indian rights are quantified is the
“practicably irrigable acres” (PIA) standard that measures the amount of
reservation land that is susceptible to irrigation, and takes into account both

147. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. Upper MRB States rely on the prior appropriation system –
where the priority date is critical among competing rights – while the lower basin States draw
from the riparian system – where water is shared among riparian users. See infra note 150.
148. Although Indians have “the best water rights in the West,” it will take significant
development “to translate the dry paper water rights into wet water in the ditches.” Gary
Weatherford & Helen Ingram, Legal-Institutional Limitations on Water Use, in WATER
SCARCITY: IMPACTS ON WESTERN AGRICULTURE 51, 78 (Ernest A. Engelbert & Ann Foley
Scheuring eds., 1984) (comments of discussant Frank J. Trelease).
149. CLARK, supra note 80, at 665.
150. A. D. Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water Rights, 22
LAND & WATER L. REV. 631, 635 (1987) [hereinafter Tarlock, One River].
151. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.03[6], at 1224-27, § 19.05[1], at
1245 (2012) (noting that after adjudication, courts apply state law when administering an Indian
water right) [hereinafter COHEN 2012]. The McCarran Amendment waives the Federal
government’s immunity and subjects the United States to state court water rights adjudication. 43
U.S.C. § 666 (2006). Although the amendment does not waive tribal sovereignty, state courts can
adjudicate Indian reserved water rights when the United States files claims in its trust capacity, on
behalf of Tribes. Arizona v. California (Arizona v. California IV), 460 U.S. 605, 626-27 (1983);
United States v. Dist. Court for Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. 520, 525 (1971). In adjudicating Indian
reserved water rights, state courts apply federal, not state law. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
152. See Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; Criteria and Procedures for the
Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights
Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223, 9223-25 (Mar. 12, 1990).
153. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990
(Settlement Act), Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3289.
155. See Carvell, supra note 14, at 47-48.
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the present as well as the future needs of the inhabitants.156 But in light of
limited arable land,157 owing to the fact that most of the fertile bottomlands
are inundated by federal reservoirs, the PIA standard may be less useful in
the MRB.158 Further, since Indian water rights settlements have not
recognized off-reservation reserved water rights,159 it is uncertain whether
arable off-reservation, Indian-owned allotments would be included in the
PIA calculation. In addition, courts have not yet determined the
implications associated with recent judicial determinations that MRB
reservations are “diminished” from historical treaty borders due to
subsequent population demographics.160 As applied to MRB reservations,
diminishment may occur in areas where a portion of a county lies on the
edge of an open reservation without a contiguous border that makes it
difficult to determine the character of land ownership.161 In light of this
danger, Tribes must take care to factor diminished areas into the arable land
calculations under the PIA standard.
In somewhat of an anomaly, the Arizona Supreme Court recently
rejected the PIA standard and articulated a new “homeland” standard that
incorporates a multi-faceted approach in light of each reservation’s
“minimal needs.”162 Similar to the argument that North Dakota Tribes
156. Arizona v. California IV, 460 U.S. at 617. While the amount is predicated on whether
agriculture is a primary purpose of the reservation – based on the relevant treaty or executive
order establishing the reservation – PIA water may be used for purposes other than agriculture.
United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1939) (concluding Winters
rights may also be used for domestic purposes and to generate electricity); In re Gen. Adjudication
of all Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys. (Big Horn I), 753 P.2d 76, 99 (Wyo. 1988)
(assuming certain domestic and municipal uses are subsumed in PIA water); see also Arizona v.
California (Arizona v. California III), 439 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1979) (approving the Special
Master’s conclusion that rights predicated on an agricultural standard may also be used for other
purposes).
157. See Arable, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arable
(last visited Dec. 5, 2012) (defining arable as “fit for or used for the growing of crops”).
158. Professor Tarlock has cautioned that the unique agronomic challenges faced by each
reservation may warrant a separate negotiated settlement with each Tribe. Tarlock, One River,
supra note 150, at 635.
159. See Alexander Hays, The Nez Perce Water Rights Settlement and the Revolution in
Indian Country, 36 ENTL. L. 869, 887 (2006). Many Indian stakeholders live off the reservation
in allotments and courts have not yet determined whether such rights allow diversions of
“reservation water” off the reservation.
160. “Diminishment” has been found in areas where historical state regulation and land
ownership by non-Indians permanently changes the character of “Indian country.” Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 475-76 n.13 (1984) (holding that while the Surplus Acts did not establish
an express congressional purpose to diminish the reservation, subsequent exercise of state or
federal jurisdiction and demographics may contribute to a finding of diminishment).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 still serves as a guidepost in determining “Indian country”: in
essence, (1) all land within the exterior boundaries of a reservation, (2) Indian trust land, and (3)
in those dependent Indian communities. COHEN 2012, supra note 151, § 304[2][c][iii]-[iv], at
189-98.
162. Gila River I, 35 P.3d 68, 76-79 (Ariz. 2001).
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present,163 the “homeland” standard evaluates the Tribe’s history (including
the cultural significance of water), economic base, past water use, present
and projected population, and topography, among other criteria.164 In light
of the challenging topography and limited natural resources in the upper
reaches, especially in the Dakotas, this “homeland standard,” may provide
for more water than under PIA.165
Another issue bearing on the MRB is tribal reliance on groundwater
sources for present and future consumptive uses166 in the face of continued
uncertainty as to whether such rights extend to groundwater.167 Resolving
this legal question is critical to integrated water resources management168
since the ability – or inability – of Tribes to access groundwater bears
heavily on both System operation and the health and welfare of those living
on reservations. First, in light of the hydrological connection between
surface and groundwater sources,169 extensive groundwater use has the
potential to reduce surface water flows,170 and thereby affect downstream

163. Carvell, supra note 14, at 35.
164. Gila River I, 35 P.3d at 79-80.
165. See Carvell, supra note 14, at 26 nn.176-79, 27-29 nn. 185-87. But see United States v.
Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d. 1050, 1065 (W.D. Wash. 2005), vacated pursuant to settlement
agreement by United States v. ex rel Lummi Nation v. Washington, No. C01-0047Z, 2007 WL
4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007) (concluding Gila River’s “homeland” standard is contrary
to the “primary purpose” standard – which evaluates the Federal government’s intent in
establishing the reservation).
166. A majority (over 1500) of Indian and non-Indian MRB communities rely exclusively on
groundwater sources; in terms of population, approximately thirty-five percent is served
exclusively from groundwater while almost fifty-four percent is served exclusively from surface
water. MASTER MANUAL, supra note 4, at E-8. Of the estimated 11.4 million acres of land
irrigated in the MRB, approximately thirty percent is served by groundwater. Id. at IV-29.
167. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.02(d) (Robert E. Beck & Amy L. Kelly eds., 3d
ed. 2009) (“The principal unresolved issue concerning the scope of waters subject to reserved
rights is whether groundwater may be claimed.”).
168. See Thompson, supra note 68, at 205.
169. Id. (citing T. C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND WATER AND
SURFACE WATER:
A SINGLE RESOURCE 3-5, figs.2, 4 & 5 (1998), available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1139/pdf/circ1139.pdf).
170. Id. Moreover, MRB groundwater sources are susceptible to overdraft. Rollin H.
Hotchkiss et al., Regulated River Modeling for Climate Change Impact Assessment: The Missouri
River, 36 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 375, 375 (2000); see also EDWARD BRADLEY, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GEOLOGY AND GROUND-WATER RESOURCES OF THE UPPER NIOBARA
RIVER BASIN, NEBRASKA AND WYOMING, 36-38 (1956) (describing the potential for increased
well development to cause a noticeable reduction in the flow of Missouri River tributaries). In
addition, the alluvial hydrogeology of the lower MRB makes it difficult to gauge how the flow of
groundwater influences MRB streams. T.C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
GROUND WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 40-41, figs. I-2A, B (1998). For
example, the altitude of the water table adjacent to the Missouri River near Glasgow, Missouri
“indicates that ground water flows into the river at right angles in some reaches, and it flows
parallel to the river in others.” Id. The flow of many Missouri River tributaries, like the Loup and
Niobrara Rivers in the Sandhills area of Nebraska, is attributed mainly to groundwater accretions.
MASTER MANUAL, supra note 4, at III-8.
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uses. Conversely, since surface water flows have the potential to feed
groundwater sources,171 competing uses that reduce surface water flows
may also drawdown important aquifers. Second, should courts with
jurisdiction in the MRB hold that reserved rights do not extend to
groundwater, Tribes would necessarily face a Hobson’s choice of either
diverting and conveying mainstem surface water great distances to satisfy
their reserved rights,172 or acquiring rights under state law to appropriate
groundwater from aquifers beneath their reservations.173
Fortunately for MRB Tribes, high court decisions in Arizona and
Montana, and a federal court decision in Washington, show a growing
consensus that, as a matter of law, reserved water rights do extend to
groundwater.174 Though the United States Supreme Court ultimately failed
to reach the issue in Cappaert v. United States,175 the Court’s recognition of
the surface-groundwater connection constituted a tacit endorsement176 of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals express finding that reserved rights do
extend to groundwater.177 The next court to directly address the issue, the
Wyoming Supreme Court, declined to follow the Ninth Circuit and, seizing
on language in Cappaert, that focused on reserving surface water, did not
find any precedent for such rights.178 But eleven years later, the Arizona
Supreme Court held reserved water rights lie in groundwater if such

171. Thompson, supra note 68, at 206.
172. See Missouri River Authorized Purposes Study (MRAPS), MISSOURI RIVER & THE
TRIBES, http://www mraps.org/study_info/missouri-river-tribes (last visited Jan. 28, 2012)
(illustrating that some reservations, including the Turtle Mountains, Spirit Lake, Lake Traverse,
Pine Ridge, and Rosebud Sioux, are not riparian to the mainstem) [hereinafter MRAPS]. But see
Dakota Water Resources Act of 2000, S. 623, 106th Cong. § 7, 1st Session (2000) (providing
Indian municipal, rural, and industrial water supplies to the Turtle Mountain and Fort Totten
Indian reservations).
173. While the more arid basin states of Montana, Wyoming, the Dakotas, Kansas, and
Nebraska follow the prior appropriation system of water rights, the more humid basin states of
Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri follow the common law of riparian rights, supplemented by a
permit system. See MR ECOSYSTEM, supra note 8, at 25.
174. See Gila River I, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999); Confederated Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation v. Stultz, 59 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Mont. 2002); United States v. Washington, 375
F.Supp.2d. 1050, 1068 n.8 (W.D. Wash. 2005), vacated pursuant to settlement agreement by
United States v. ex rel Lummi Nation v. Washington, No. C01-0047Z, 2007 WL 4190400 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 20, 2007).
175. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); see Gila River I, 989 P.2d at 747.
176. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143 (“[S]ince the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is
based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold that the United
States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or
groundwater.”).
177. See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1974).
178. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, 99-100 (Wyo. 1988) (agreeing with Special Master Roncalio
and the district court that the reserved water doctrine did “not extend to groundwater”).

2012]

INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT

127

supplies are necessary to fulfill the primary purpose of the reservation.179
Three years later, the Montana Supreme Court also held reserved water
rights apply to groundwater but disavowed any prioritization of surface
over groundwater.180 Recently, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead and
agreed that, as a matter of law, reserved rights extend to groundwater –
even in the absence of a surface water connection – and found no precedent
for a preference for surface water.181 Therefore, the three recent decisions
in Arizona, Montana, and Washington indicate MRB Tribes stand a chance
at prevailing in adjudications involving claims to reserved rights in
groundwater.
Going forward, it is still uncertain exactly how the above decisions will
influence general stream adjudication or state-tribe compacting within the
jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. But, given the unique
facts animating the Supreme Court’s decision in Cappaert,182 there exists
ample authority within the treaty context and under the Property Clause183
to support state and federal court findings that reserved rights apply to
groundwater anytime such sources are needed to support the primary
purpose184 for which the land was reserved from the public domain.185
In Cappaert, the Court relied on premises first established in the Indian
treaty context that were not altogether applicable to the national monument
context.186 First, in Winters v. United States,187 the Court construed a treaty
179. Gila River I, 989 P.2d at 747. In prioritizing the utilization of surface water to fulfill its
needs, the court clarified that the location of the source is less important than “whether it is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” Id. at 747-48.
180. Confederated Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Stultz, 59 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Mont.
2002).
181. United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d. 1050, 1068 n.8 (W.D. Wash. 2005),
vacated pursuant to settlement agreement by United States v. ex rel Lummi Nation v. Washington,
No. C01-0047Z, 2007 WL 4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007).
182. In Cappaert the Court examined “the scope” of the reserved water rights doctrine
(doctrine) as it applies to maintaining the depth of an underground pool in Devil’s Hole so as to
preserve the scientific value of the national monument, for which the reservation was established.
426 U.S. at 141-47. Devil’s Hole is a limestone cavern containing a pool that provides habitat for
the Devil’s Hole pupfish (Cyprinodon diabolis), a species listed as endangered under the ESA.
United States v Cappaert, 375 F. Supp. 456, 460 (D. Nev. 1974); Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006). In 1952, President Truman withdrew from the public domain land
surrounding Devil’s Hole via Proclamation pursuant to Executive authority under the American
Antiquities Preservation Act (Antiquities Act). See also 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006); Exec. Proc. No.
2961, 17 Fed. Reg. 691 (Jan. 23, 1952).
183. The Property Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.” U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
184. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
185. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
187. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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establishing Fort Belknap Indian Reservation188 in light of the Federal
government’s trust obligations to the Indians.189 The reserved water rights
doctrine was thus the product of interpreting a treaty, pursuant to canons of
construction, in a manner favorable to the Indians.190 The Court also
intimated that treaty power was sufficient to sustain the doctrine when it
declined to address whether it is premised on riparian rights.191 Thus, the
Winters Court based its decision on the United States’ special trust
obligation to the Indians and the particular purpose in establishing the
reservation.
The Winters Court also relied on United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co. (Rio Grande)192 for its conclusion that the United States may
reserve water from appropriation under state law.193 However, the Court’s
conclusion in Rio Grande was based on the inability of a State to destroy
the Federal government’s common law right, as owner of land bordering
the Rio Grande, to the continued flow of its waters,194 and the government’s
authority to preserve the navigability of waters under the Commerce
Clause.195 Thus, the reserved water right is partially rooted in the
188. Winters, 207 U.S. at 547-77; Agreement with the Indians of the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in Montana, reprinted in 1 LAWS & TREATIES 601 (1904).
189. 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (noting “ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the
standpoint of the Indians”).
190. The three canons of construction are: (1) treaties are liberally construed to favor
Indians; (2) ambiguity is resolved in favor of Indians; (3) treaties are construed as Indians would
have understood them – therefore, resource rights are implied from treaties. COHEN 2012, supra
note 151, § 2.02[i], at 113-14. The need to exercise such canons “was rooted in the special trust
relationship between the United States and Indian tribes.” Id. at 223-24. In addition, the express
purpose in establishing the reservation was to change the Indians from a “nomadic and
uncivilized” people to a “pastoral and civilized” people through settlement and agriculture –
which required water for irrigation. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. Moreover, with respect to the
establishment of Indian reservations, “[i]t would be unconscionable for the United States to have
coerced or induced Indians onto a Reservation without providing the water necessary to make the
lands habitable” and “[i]t would be irrational to assume that the intent was merely to set aside the
arid soil without reserving the means of rendering it productive.” Report of the Special Master at
260, Arizona v. California, 372 U.S. 549 (1963) (No. 8, Orig.) (Dec. 5, 1960), available at
http://wwa.colorado.edu/colorado_river/law html [hereinafter Special Master’s 1960 Report]; see
also Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 344, 339 (9th Cir. 1939).
191. The navigable Milk River forms the northern boundary of the reservation; thus, the
United States could alternatively have asserted a reserved – riparian – water right.
192. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
193. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
194. The Court explained that a State may not interfere with the Federal government’s
riparian right to the continuous flow of water. Id. at 703-04.
195. The Court based its authority to enjoin construction of the dam on the likelihood of the
dam interfering with navigation downstream. Id. at 709; see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Even in instances when the Court acquiesces to an attenuated link to navigability, the Court makes
an effort to describe how the particular reservation might affect navigation. For example, in
Arizona v. California (Arizona v. California I) the Court “preserved the fiction that a navigation
purpose would be served” when it upheld Congress’ power to authorize multipurpose dams for
primarily non-navigable purposes (e.g., electricity generation and water storage), notwithstanding
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government’s superior right as a landowner.196 Therefore, Cappaert should
not bar future MRB tribal claims to groundwater since reserved water rights
are premised on the unique Indian treaty context and the Federal
government’s power under the Property Clause to reserve land from the
public domain.
Even though States and Tribes have pursued quantification of reserved
rights through state-tribal compacts,197 general stream adjudications,198 and
settlements,199 the great weight of such rights still presses down, stifling
comprehensive basin planning. Development of the potential 8.6 MAF in
Indian reserved water rights would upset established uses200 and prevent the
Corps from meeting program objectives.201 And in the absence of
congressional legislation to reform the archaic Flood Control Act of 1944,

the dams’ propensity to destroy the navigability of affected rivers. Charles J. Meyers, The
Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 40 (1966).
196. In Arizona v. California II, Special Master Rifkind explained as much: “In the Winters
case the United States exercised its power to reserve water by a treaty; but the power itself stems
from the United States’ property rights in the water, not from the treaty power.” Special Master’s
1960 Report, supra note 190, at 259 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S.
526, 537-38 (1840) (holding that Congress’ power over the public lands under the Property Clause
is vested without limitation, such that the President may withdraw land even if the effect is to
encroach on state rights). Since the pool in Devil’s Hole Monument is wholly removed from
navigable water, it was incumbent upon the Cappaert Court to announce whether Property Clause
authority might make up for an absence of Commerce Clause authority sufficient to enjoin the
Cappaerts’ pumping.
197. Montana has taken the lead in quantifying Indian reserved water rights within its
borders through compacts with various Tribes and federal agencies. For example, Tribes have
compacted for the following amounts: Assisnboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation, 1.05 MAF/yr for marketing on the reservation (50 TAF/yr off the reservation), or that
necessary for consumptive use of 525 TAF/yr; Northern Cheyenne, total of 34.3 TAF/yr;
Chippewa Cree Tribe, 8.5 TAF/yr; Crow Tribe, 547 TAF/yr; Fort Belknap Reservation, 645 cfs of
the United States’ share and 4 TAF/yr for non-irrigation purposes; Blackfeet Tribe, 100 cfs to
Birch Creek and 50 TAF/yr to St. Mary Drainage. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-20-201, -301, -601, 901, -1001, -1501 (2009).
198. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water and Water Rights on the
Mo. River Sys., State of South Dakota, 531 F. Supp. 449 (D.S.D. 1982) (dismissing South
Dakota’s general adjudication, on the State’s motion). In Wyoming, the Arapahoe and Shoshone
Tribes of the Wind River Reservation secured approximately 500 TAF/yr through the Big Horn
general stream adjudication. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn
River Sys., 835 P.2d 273, 286 (Wyo. 1992).
199. Elsewhere in the MRB, States like North Dakota have entered into settlement
negotiations with Tribes, but to no avail. See Carvell, supra note 14, at 42-46 (describing
unsuccessful efforts to reach an agreeable settlement negotiation framework with the Turtle
Mountain Band, Three Affiliated Tribes, and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe).
200. See supra note 137 (statement of Sen. Conrad).
201. Capossela, supra note 19, at 159. It’s also uncertain whether the Master Manual affords
sufficient flexibility to accommodate future diversions for Indian reserved water rights in the
basin; see SURPLUS WATER REPORT, supra note 71, at 2-12. For example, while demand for
irrigation use is relatively low, “reservoir levels and low river stages can at times make access to
the available water supply difficult or inconvenient to obtain . . . .” Id. at 2-15.
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the Corps remains a prisoner to the status quo.202 Yet the inter-sovereign
compact provides a way forward, as it constitutes federal legislation that
would supersede the present regime.203
B. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IMPLIES JOINT RESPONSIBILITY IN WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
The drive of Tribes to preserve reserved water rights is intertwined
with the complementary mission to further tribal sovereignty204 – that is, a
government’s ability to govern all of the people and things within its
territory.205 The Constitution expressly provides that Tribes comprise a
third sovereign under the Indian Commerce Clause,206 and this idea also
finds support in the United States’ treaty making power.207 Although the
notion of the Federal government’s trust relationship is borne of a
colonizing doctrine,208 even the current judicial formulation of tribal
sovereignty requires that Tribes be offered a seat at the table in any
discussions involving the management of tribal resources. And since a
ratified compact becomes a “law of the United States”209 with the power to
supersede inconsistent state210 and federal laws,211 Congress’ power to
202. The Corps maintains:
“[u]nless specifically provided for by Federal statute,
quantification of water rights does not entail an allocation of storage at Corps reservoirs. The
Corps recognizes, however, that the tribes have claims to reserved water rights, and will, to the
extent possible, continue to operate the Mainstem Reservoir System [System] based on that
recognition.” Water Problems on the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 27 (2004) (statement of Brig. Gen. Grisoli, Nw. Div. Eng’r,
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs). The Corps’ stance mirrors that of Interior: while its water supply
contracts “would be subject to final legal determination” of reserved rights, “[w]e cannot stop all
water development projects until Indian water rights are quantified.” Tarlock, One River, supra
note 150, at 634 n.19 (quoting statement of James A. Rawlings, Reg’l Supervisor of Water and
Land, Upper Mo. Region Bureau of Reclamation). Although developers terminated the ETSI
project, it’s unclear whether Reclamation has changed its policy toward major diversionary
projects. See Indian Policy of the Bureau of Reclamation, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
http://www.usbr.gov/native/naao/policies/policy html (last visited Dec. 5, 2012); see Tupper,
supra note 65.
203. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
204. CLARK, supra note 80, at 669.
205. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 54 (1997).
206. If Tribes were not sovereign, there would have been no need for the founders to
expressly include them with respect to Congress’ power to regulate commerce. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
207. Though implicit, treaties are simply diplomatic agreements between sovereigns. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
208. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 205, at 42 (chronicling the doctrine’s reinforcement of
notions of inferiority that chip away at tribal sovereignty).
209. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1998) (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449
U.S. 433, 438 (1981)). Accord Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) (“[U]nless the
compact to which Congress consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief
inconsistent with its express terms.”).
210. Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534-35 (1941).
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attach conditions to the agreement212 also has the potential to threaten tribal
jurisdiction over natural resources.
The origin of a contemporary concept of tribal sovereignty is found in
the first of Justice Marshall’s three seminal opinions on Indian Law,
Johnson v. McIntosh.213 In McIntosh, Justice Marshall laid the groundwork
for the notion of a trust responsibility by announcing how the act of
discovery gave Europeans title to the land and subsequent conquest
extinguished the Indian right to occupancy.214 Later, in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,215 the Court highlighted how the constitution contradistinguishes
“Indian Tribes” from “foreign Nations,” concluding that the Tribes’ distinct
political society exists beneath the United States’ broader sovereignty, like
a “domestic dependent nation.”216 In deciding Worcester v. Georgia217 two
years later, the Court expanded on its analysis, recognizing that the
character of the treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the United States
evinced notions of equality and, as such, did not reduce the Tribe’s political
existence or national character.218 The acts and treaties considered Indian
Nations as distinct political communities with exclusive authority within
their boundaries, and thus negated the effect of state laws within the
reservation.219 Thus, MRB Tribes enjoy a limited sovereignty220 over their
right to self-government that perseveres to this day.
This notion of limited sovereignty, however, is limited in the sense that
tribal authority falls under the umbrella of broader federal constitutional

211. NORMAN J. SINGER, 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
23:18, at 525-26 (6th ed. 2002) (“[T]he latest expression of the legislative will prevails, the statute
last passed will prevail over a statute passed before it.”).
212. See COHEN 2012, supra note 151, § 5.02[3], at 393-94, § 7.05[1][b], at 639-40 (noting a
Tribe’s sovereign powers are subject to qualification by the express legislation of Congress); see
also MODEL COMPACT, supra note 20, at 89-90. Yet the authors of the Model Compact failed to
announce by what constitutional mechanism a compact could possibly “supersede” inconsistent
tribal law. In essence, while the Supremacy Clause and the concept of preemption control the
interplay of federal and state law in the natural resources arena, Tribes still maintain “extraconstitutional” authority – borne of tribal organic law – to exercise their right to self-government.
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 (1981).
213. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
214. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 587.
215. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
216. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2, 18.
217. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
218. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 549, 555.
219. Id. at 556-57.
220. A sovereignty in which: (1) Tribes possess all the powers of a sovereign State; (2)
conquest renders the Tribes subject to the legislative power of the United States but preserves
internal sovereignty (i.e., self rule); and (3) such powers are subject to qualification by treaties,
and the express legislation by Congress. COHEN 2012, supra note 151, § 4.01[1][a] and [b], §
4.02[1], at 206-12, 222.
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authority, but is no less powerful in its application in Indian country.221 For
example, the Court in United States v. Wheeler222 affirmed the notion of a
preexisting independent tribal sovereignty,223 holding the Federal
government never took away the Navajo’s power to punish.224 Therefore,
MRB Tribes exist as separate sovereigns, whose political communities
stand apart from those distinct state and federal political communities that
operate within the constraints imposed by the federal constitution. By
tweaking the federal compact device, Tribes would be afforded the means
to exercise their separate sovereignty in a manner similar to that of the
States.
Aside from examples of States treating Tribes as sister sovereigns in
compacts related to allocation225 or gaming,226 there exists additional
support for the notion that tribal sovereignty is equal in stature 227 to that of
state sovereignty in the environmental regulation context. After the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that environmental laws also apply to Indian
lands,228 the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
adopted a policy of treating “tribes as states” for purposes of implementing
nearly all of the major pollution control programs.229 In practice, EPA
221. “Although physically within the territory of the United States and subject to ultimate
federal control, they nonetheless remain a separate people, with the power of regulating their
internal and social relations.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (citing United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831)).
For example, the Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog endorsed a robust tribal sovereignty in
holding that federal courts did not have jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crimes. 109 U.S. 556,
571-72 (1883). The Court reasoned that a strict interpretation of the treaty language of “subject to
laws of United States” would reverse the prevailing federal policy of advancing the dependent
community into a self-supporting orderly government. Id.
222. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
223. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-23; see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896)
(holding tribal power to make laws, and provide for trial and punishment is not a federal power in
that it does not spring from the federal constitution but derives from its own organic law).
224. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323-24. In essence the Navajo retain that aspect of primeval
sovereignty that has not yet been divested via treaty, statute, or by implication of the Tribe’s
dependent status. Id.
225. See, e.g., State of Montana-Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort Belknap
Reservation-United States Water Rights Compact. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2011).
226. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2710(d)(3)(A) (2006).
Congress envisioned state-tribal compacts in the gaming context as “negotiated agreement[s]
between two political entities that resolves questions of overlapping jurisdictions.” CORNTASSEL
WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD
110-11 (2006).
227. But state and tribal authority remain distinct, since each “derive[s] power from different
sources;” specifically, “the organic law that established it.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313.
228. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 555-56 (10th Cir. 1986).
229. In the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAA), Congress granted Tribes primary
authority to administer an implementation plan to meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or within the Tribe’s jurisdiction. 42
U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2006); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 49 (2011). See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d
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views tribal governments as appropriate non-federal parties for making
decisions and carrying out environmental laws on the reservation, even if
the nature of authority in implementing a national pollution control program
is different from that authority undergirding tribal regulatory jurisdiction.230
Thus, Congress’ broad policy of acknowledging Tribes’ inherent authority
to regulate pollution – and Tribes’ governmental capacity to implement
national programs – indicates a congressional amenability to full tribal
participation in administrating a MRB water resources compact.
While Congress’ historical exercise of its plenary power in regulating
the affairs of Indians often has the effect of reducing tribal authority and
jurisdiction,231 Congress could instead wield this power in its consent to an
1280, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (striking down a challenge to EPA’s interpretation of tribal
authority to regulate individual air pollutants). In a nod to the sometime divergent views of state
and tribal regulators, EPA assumes responsibility for those provisions of the relevant program that
the Tribes choose not to implement. Congress has similarly vested Tribes with authority to
implement Clean Water Act (CWA) programs, principally through issuance of permits under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2006) (treating
“tribes as states” so long as the Tribe has a governmental body, reservation, and the capability to
implement the relevant provisions); 40 C.F.R. § 123.31-.34 (2011). Tribes are also empowered to
administer section 404 permits regulating the discharge of dredged or fill material in nonnavigable reservation wetlands and waterways; the Corps continues to regulate navigable waters
under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. 40 C.F.R. § 233.60-.62 (2011); Clean
Water Act, Section 404 Tribal Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 8171 (Feb. 11, 1993) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 232 and 233 (2011)). EPA may treat “tribes as states” under the 1986 amendments to
the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-(j) (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.72, .76, .78, 144.2,
145.52, .56, .58 (2011). Also, EPA treats Tribes “substantially” as States under the 1986
amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (2006) (waiving the cost-sharing requirements under
section 9604(c)(3) that applies to States when hazardous waste cleanup is initiated by the Tribe).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is the only federal pollution control
program administered by EPA that does not specifically delegate authority to Tribes. 42 U.S.C. §
6901 (2006) (defining Tribes as “municipalities”). Though RCRA’s “municipality” exception
should not be read as Congress vouchsafing greater authority upon the States: in Washington
Dept. of Ecology v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation of RCRA as not granting
States authority to enforce state hazardous waste regulations against Tribes or individual Indians
on Indian lands. 752 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1985).
230. Whereas Tribes receive delegated regulatory authority to implement federal programs
on the reservation, Tribes exercise their inherent sovereignty in regulating activities that have a
direct effect on the political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare. See Indian
Reservation Water Quality Standards Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (Dec. 12, 1991) (outlining the
regulatory jurisdiction of Tribes); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981); City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423-24 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding EPA’s decision to allow
Pueblo Isleta to impose water quality standards for that reach of the Rio Grande flowing through
the reservation was “permissible, because it is in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal
sovereignty”); Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding Tribes have
inherent authority to regulate all sources of pollutant emissions in the reservation so long as
activities are “serious and substantial”) (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560
(1981)).
231. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903) (establishing the plenary power
authority theory by which Congress has unlimited political power to modify treaties so long as it
does so in explicit terms). The source of Congress’ plenary power springs from the Indian
Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, and the Treaty Clause, Article II, Section 2,
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inter-sovereign compact that artfully accommodates each sovereign’s
interests in Missouri River water resources. Also, there is no explicit
constitutional language suggesting a limitation on Congress’ authority to
relax restrictions on tribal jurisdiction232 – in essence, the Constitution does
not dictate the metes and bounds of tribal autonomy.233 Therefore,
Congress is permitted to modify the degree of autonomy in light of Tribes’
“dependent sovereign” status.234 Also, since Congress’ plenary power is
partly political in nature,235 it retains significant discretion to advance the
federal policy of championing tribal self-government and selfdetermination236 through its endorsement of a tripartite compact.237
Finally, it is uncertain whether the United States could meet its trust
responsibility to MRB Tribes if it were to task a federal representative on a
compact commission with representing tribal interests until Indian reserved
water rights are quantified. In upholding the Court of Claims’ embrace of
the “good faith effort” test in United States v. Sioux Nation,238 the Supreme

Clause 2. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). Congress often flexes its plenary
power in the abrogation of Indian treaties. See generally United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
743-44 (1986) (holding Congress abrogated the Yankton Sioux Tribe of its exclusive rights to
hunt and fish on reservation such that hunting of protected bald eagles was punishable under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) (87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1982 ed. And
Supp. II)) and Bald Eagle Protection Act (54 Stat. 250, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq. (1986))); Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960) (holding tribal fee land may
be taken because general acts of Congress apply equally to Indians in the absence of “clear
expression to contrary”); Seneca Nation of Indians v. Brucker, 262 F.2d 27, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(holding Congress had in a “sufficiently clear and specific way, shown an intention” to authorize
the taking of Seneca land through flooding attributed to the operation of a Corps dam); South
Dakota v. Borland, 508 U.S. 679, 690 (1993) (holding that Congress, in passing the Cheyenne
River Act, extinguished the Tribe’s original treaty right to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing
on federal water project lands). Perhaps, suprisngly, this plenary power is grounded on the
concept of dependency in that Congress wields the power to protect Tribes. See Nat’l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-51 (1985).
232. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
233. See id. at 194 (noting that Congress is free to change “judicially made” Indian law
through legislation).
234. Id. at 205 (explaining that Congress’ intent to lift restrictions on tribal criminal
jurisdiction does not interfere with state authority or power).
235. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
236. Memorandum from President to All Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59
Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994); Exec. Order No. 13,007, Indian Sacred Sites, 61 Fed. Reg.
26,771 (May 24, 1996) (requiring the Federal government and its agencies to engage in
government-to-government consultation with Tribes); Exec. Order No. 13,084, Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 19, 1998); Exec. Order
No. 13,175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249
(Nov. 6, 2000).
237. Critics of an inter-sovereign compact approach should not construe tribal participation
as an action to “rekindl[e] embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold,” since MRB Tribes
never relinquished the reins of government nor their exclusive treaty rights. See City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 214 (2005).
238. 448 U.S. 371, 416 (1980).
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Court agreed Congress could not simultaneously act as trustee for the
benefit of Indians (in essence, exercising plenary power for the Indians’
best interest), and exercise its eminent domain power through a taking of
Indian property under the Fifth Amendment.239 The Court has also held the
Executive is similarly accountable under the trust relationship. In Seminole
Nation v. United States,240 the Court held United States officials are to be
judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards in meeting trust obligations
in their dealings with dependent Indians.241 Moreover, the Federal
government’s duty to conform its actions to this exacting standard flows
beyond the Indian property context,242 to situations where the government
maintains supervisory and managerial responsibility for natural
resources.243 Therefore, federal agencies are beholden to this heightened
fiduciary standard in managing the trust corpus, which includes MRB water
resources.
Even at present, federal control244 exacerbates a historical conflict of
interest245 between the Federal government’s duty to operate the System for
multiple purposes and the government’s fiduciary duty to protect tribal trust
239. “In any given situation in which Congress has acted with regard to Indian people, it
must have acted in one capacity or the other . . . Congress can own two hats, but it cannot wear
them both at the same time.” Id. at 408-09.
240. 316 U.S. 286, (1942).
241. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97; see also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v.
U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420-21 (9th Cir. 1990).
242. Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d at 1420.
243. For example, the Federal government owes a “fiduciary duty” to Tribes to leverage its
authority to the fullest extent possible to preserve water resources. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.D.C. 1972). The Ninth Circuit also held that the Federal
government’s duty to “preserve and protect” the fishery “extend[ed] to any federal government
action.” Tribe v. Navy, 898 F.2d at 1420. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224-25
(1983) (finding the existence of a fiduciary relation in light of the language of statutes regulating
timber harvests on reservations).
244. Davidson, supra note 31, at 11; ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 505
(1988) (holding that even the Secretary of the Interior must seek approval from the Secretary of
the Army before diverting any water from System reservoirs). Given the sheer size of each
mainstem reservoir, the scope of the Federal government’s jurisdiction is expansive, as it
encompasses the entire impoundment area, often stretching for miles upstream of each dam. See
MASTER MANUAL, supra note 4, at pt. IV.
245. Federal interests in flood protection and reclamation have long dominated Indian
interests in the MRB. In inundating ninety-four percent of Fort Berthold Reservation’s prime
agricultural land, the Corps displaced approximately three hundred forty families and plunged the
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Tribes into an existence premised on federal social services. 2
SALLY THOMPSON ET AL., TRIBAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN HISTORY: GREAT PLAINSUPPER MISSOURI RIVER 110 (2009). “Seizure of Indian lands and rights to the use of water in
disregard of human rights and dignities is the hallmark of the outrage [of] Indians of that
reservation.” Veeder, supra note 140, at 634 & n.90 (tabulating federal projects’ interference with
Indian rights). President Nixon, in an address to Congress, remarked: “No self-respecting law
firm would allow itself to represent two opposing clients in one dispute, yet the Federal
government has frequently found itself in that position.” 116 CONG. REC. 10,894, 10,896 (daily
ed. July 9, 1970).
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resources.246 Corps water supply agreements cultivate both a reliance on
water resources and an expectation of access to such supplies on the part of
irrigators, municipalities, and other contracting parties.247 Even if the
organizational structure of a MRB compact commission divested the
Federal government of its primary control, such water supply agreements
have the potential to directly and indirectly harm the trust corpus. First, it is
uncertain whether MRB Tribes would have access to sufficient surface
water to fulfill quantified rights given the present allocation scheme. 248
Second, while there exists recognition that economic development
strengthens tribal sovereignty,249 contracts to divert reservoir water for oil
and natural gas development may ultimately harm tribal resources.250
Given this present conflict of interest, it is essential that a tribal
representative be allowed to participate on an equal footing with other
representatives to any future compact commission in decisions affecting
water resources.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the Federal government’s substantial interest in flood protection,
navigation, and national security, and tribal interests in reserved water
rights and tribal sovereignty, compact drafters should distribute power
equally among federal, state, and tribal representatives to any future
compact commission. Although Congress retains plenary power to regulate
compact commission activities that bear on federal interests, a federal
presence is instrumental in coordinating the massive network of flood
246. In United States v. Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court articulated the common sense
notion that the federal government “cannot wear both hats at the same time” in upholding its trust
obligation and advancing its own interests. 448 U.S. 371, 408-09 (1980). The Court ultimately
held that the Act of 1877 ratifying the agreement between the Sioux Nation and United States
effected a compensable taking of land in the Black Hills of South Dakota. Id. at 421, 422.
247. North Dakota Congressman Kent Conrad recognized that Corps water supply contracts
with downstream users creates a situation that will “make it impossible for [Tribes] to access
water for present and future uses.” Impact Suffered by the Tribes in the Upper Basin of the
Missouri River: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 22 (2003)
(statement of Sen. Kent Conrad of North Dakota, Member, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
248. In preparation of the Missouri River Master Manual Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS), the Corps considered a low-end estimate of 3.5 million acre-feet (MAF) of
potential claims for Indian reserved water rights and a high-end estimate of 6.5 MAF. VINEYARD,
supra note 135, at 25. The Mni-Sose Intertribal Water Rights Coalition estimated that Tribes were
entitled 21.5 MAF in total rights – of which 10.9 MAF could be depleted – against an average
Missouri River annual outflow of 20 MAF. Id.
249. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 205, at 138.
250. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER
SOURCES 35 (2011) (citing a number of reports, EPA expressed that “improperly sealed wells may
be able to provide subsurface pathways for ground water pollution by allowing contaminant
migration to sources of drinking water”).
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control works to protect downstream agricultural land, whose production
contributes to national security. It is also of critical importance that any
compact provide Tribes with a forum in which they can protect reserved
rights to MRB surface and groundwater, and exercise tribal sovereignty. A
purely federal-interstate compact necessarily encroaches on tribal
sovereignty by limiting Tribes’ ability to enter into realistic government-togovernment relationships in the management of MRB water resources.251
Because the inability of Tribes to access reserved water rights threatens
aspects of self-government, it is critical they are invited to participate in
regional decision making.252 As applied, a tripartite approach recognizes
the third sovereign’s zone of authority, free from intrusion by other
sovereigns.253
Since justice is, at its root, relational,254 a new forum in which each
sovereign could redefine her relationships through collaborative problem
solving would directly address a history of heartbreak in the MRB.255
Though allowing for tribal participation prior to quantification would depart
from traditional compacting practice, authors of the Model Compact
conceded “it is both equitable and essential that the [Tribes] collectively be
represented in any compact governance institution in a voting capacity by a
representative of their choice.”256 Yet, unlike the authors’ insistence that
one commissioner represent the collective interests of all basin Tribes,
drafters of a twenty-first century MRB compact should carefully consider
how to create a tribal bloc whose voting weight is equal to that of its sister
sovereigns.’ This will likely prove difficult: in the allocation and gaming
spheres, States usually compact with one Tribe. However, the Forum
Committee of the Columbia River Basin Forum (CRBF), formerly known

251. Tribes retain broad civil authority to regulate on-reservation actions that affect their
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of their members. Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 (1981).
252. To be clear, the author is not a tribal member nor purports to know whether there exists
a present consensus – if any exists – of MRB tribal amenability to a tripartite compact approach.
However, in light of state and tribal disagreement as to the prioritization of conflicting water uses,
from an outsider’s perspective, a forum, such as that provided by a commission charged with
implementing an inter-sovereign compact, presents a more inclusive means to manage Missouri
River water resources. Such an arrangement likely has a better chance of moving the reserved
water rights quantification discussion forward and honoring the robust sovereignty that MRB
Tribes presently enjoy.
253. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 205, at 100. Professor Pommersheim acknowledges
that regional forums, like tribal-state water compacts, foster meaningful dialogue that improves
inter-sovereign relations. Id. at 160.
254. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, at xiv (1990).
255. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 245, at 110.
256. MODEL COMPACT, supra note 20, at 27 n.27.
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as the Three Sovereigns,257 might offer a viable model for an equal balance
of federal-state-tribal representation and participation. Though short-lived,
CRBF served as a regional forum for communication, coordination, and
collaboration in the preparation of the National Marine Fisheries Service’s
(NMFS) 2000 Biological Opinion on the Federal Columbia River Power
System.258 Finally, this inclusive approach embraces the notion of a “new”
west, where balancing water resources development with respect for the
landscape is essential: the inter-sovereign compact would allow regional
stakeholders to stand shoulder to shoulder in defending water resources
against common enemies.259

257. Northwest Power and Conservation Council, http://www nwcouncil.org/fw/3sov/crb
forum htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
258. Representation on the governing Forum Committee was shared equally among four
tribal representatives, four federal representatives, and a representative of each of the four
northwest States. Enclosure to the Memorandum from the Federal Caucus on the Multi-Species
Framework Project 1-2 (June 22, 1999) (on file with author).
259. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 205, at 139, 197.

